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[I]s there at all a threshold before you can call, under the
statute, a child an “Indian child”? 3/256ths? . . . I’m just
wondering is 3/256ths close—close to zero?
—Chief Justice Roberts, Oral Argument in Adoptive Couple v.
Baby Girl (April 16, 2013)1
[An “Indian” under federal law] should be one-half. . . .
What we are trying to do is get rid of the Indian problem rather
than add to it.
—Sen. Burton K. Wheeler, Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs (1934)2
1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 42–43, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133
S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (No. 12-399).
2. To Grant to Indians Living Under Federal Tutelage the Freedom to Organize for
Purposes of Local Self-Government and Economic Enterprise: Hearing on S. 2755 and S. 3645
Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong. 100 (1934) [hereinafter Senate
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Baby girl A.D. [has] more than 50% non-Indian blood . . . .
Some of the tribes consider individuals with only a tiny
percentage of Indian blood to be Indian.
—Complaint, A.D. v. Washburn (July 6, 2015)3
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, several Supreme Court Justices
began to question whether a Tribal Nation could grant citizenship
to a child of a tribal citizen if the child lacks sufficient blood
quantum. As Chief Justice Roberts asked, “is there at all a threshold”
at which the child of a tribal citizen can no longer be considered
eligible for citizenship in a Tribal Nation?4 For the 567 federally
recognized Tribal Nations that remain in existence today, the
suggestion that at a certain point federal law will preclude their
citizens from giving birth to another generation of citizens is
alarming, to say the least.
This concept, however, is not new or even uniquely
contemporary. Instead, this same concept—specifically, the idea that
a minimum blood quantum is necessary before federal law will
recognize an individual as a citizen of a Tribal Nation—originated at
the turn of the twentieth century during the Allotment Era, when
the United States sought to eliminate tribal governments, and their
citizens, altogether.5 From 1887 through the Termination Era in the
1950s, the federal government imposed minimum blood quantum
requirements to define tribal citizenship as part of an overall effort
to (1) eliminate the number of individuals to whom the federal
government owed a trust responsibility,6 (2) transfer millions of

Committee Hearing on Self-Government] (emphasis added) (statement of Sen. Burton
K. Wheeler, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs).
3. Complaint at ¶¶ 9, 41, A.D. v. Washburn, No. 2:15-CV-01259-NVW (D. Ariz.
filed July 6, 2015) [hereinafter Goldwater Litigation Complaint], appeal docketed, No.
17-15839 (9th Cir. Apr. 26, 2017).
4. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 42–43.
5. See, e.g., Ryan W. Schmidt, American Indian Identity and Blood Quantum in the
21st Century: A Critical Review, J. ANTHROPOLOGY, 2011, at 1, 4–5,
https://www.hindawi.com/journals/janthro/2011/549521/.
6. See 1894 BD. OF INDIAN COMM’RS ANN. REP. 65 (statement of Charles H.
Mansur, Assistant Comptroller of the Treasury and former member of Congress)
(“A great defect in the Federal laws hitherto has been the want of an enactment to
determine when an Indian ceases to be an Indian . . . . I have . . . seen dozens and
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acres from Tribal Nations to non-Indian ownership,7 and (3) justify
wholesale termination of federal recognition of entire Tribes.8
The Allotment Era, however, marked the very first period in
which the United States federal government imposed minimum
blood quantum requirements to define tribal citizenship under
federal law.9 Prior to the Allotment Era, from the inception of the
United States until the late nineteenth century, the federal
government consistently recognized “Indian” as a political
designation signifying citizenship in an Indian Nation.10 That is, at
no time in the nineteenth century did the United States ever
uniformly impose a minimum amount of blood quantum to define
an “Indian” under federal law.11 In the hundreds of treaties signed
dozens of delegates from the so-called Five Civilized Tribes . . . . Nearly all of them
were white men. White Indians! . . . I propose . . . any member in whom the white
blood predominates of any Indian tribe . . . shall be taken and considered a white
person . . . .”); see also Senate Committee Hearing on Self-Government, supra note 2, at
263–64.
7. Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property Rights and the Myth of
Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559, 1610–11 (2001) (discussing the loss of
more than sixty percent of the 138 million acres of tribally-held lands at the
beginning of the Allotment Era, in which a contributing factor was “the Indian
Office . . . issuing patents, including passing on landowner applications at the
reservation superintendent’s recommendation, sending ‘competency commissions’
out to visit and examine Indian landowners, and issuing ‘forced fee’ patents to any
allotment owner of less than one-half ‘Indian blood’”).
8. VINE DELORIA JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS: AN INDIAN MANIFESTO 56
(1969) (citing the testimony of Commissioner of Indian Affairs William
Zimmerman before a congressional hearing in 1947 that to determine whether a
Tribe could be terminated from federal recognition, he would first look at “the
degree of acculturation of the particular tribe” which “includes such factors as the
admixture of white blood”).
9. W.H.H. Miller, Secretary of the Interior, To the Secretary of the Interior: Indian
Allottees Under the Act of 1887, 19 Op. Att’y Gen. 559 (May 21, 1890) [hereinafter
Miller Opinion]; see also Schmidt, supra note 5, at 4 (“The allotment era (1887–1934)
saw the concept of blood quantum become officially integrated into the legal status
of Indian identity . . . .”).
10. See Bethany R. Berger, Reconciling Equal Protection and Federal Indian Law, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 1165, 1177 (2010); see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 560
(1832) (“The Indian [N]ations had always been considered as distinct, independent
political communities, retaining their original natural rights . . . . The very term
‘nation,’ so generally applied to them, means ‘a people distinct from others.’”).
11. Schmidt, supra note 5, at 4 (“Although federal officials were aware of the
use of blood quantum to trace ancestry, it was infrequently employed. Spruhan
contends officials prior to the early twentieth century preferred to define tribal
membership through matrilineal and patrilineal descent, or those criteria set up by
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between Tribal Nations and the United States, the United States
consistently recognized the inherent right of Tribal Nations to
define their own citizenship requirements.12
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the federal
government became desperate to open up tribal lands on
reservations for white settlement.13 To do this, Congress passed a
series of allotment acts and ultimately, during the course of their
implementation, imposed a minimum amount of blood quantum to
define tribal citizenship and thereby diminish the authority of Tribal
Nations over both their lands and their citizens.14
Federal policy changed again in 1934, when the federal
government passed the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) and once
again defined “Indian” under federal law as individuals “who are
members of any recognized tribe now under federal jurisdiction”
without regard for whether they met a minimum blood quantum
requirement.15 With the IRA, the federal government restored its
original understanding that “Indian” constitutes a political
classification based on citizenship in a Sovereign Tribal Nation.16
Since 1934, with the exception of select termination acts in the
1950s, Congress and the Supreme Court have repeatedly recognized
and affirmed the inherent right of Tribal Nations to define their own
rules and regulations regarding who qualifies for citizenship in a
Nation—regardless of blood quantum.17
It is true that some Tribal Nations currently maintain citizenship
laws that require a certain amount of blood quantum to be eligible
for citizenship.18 That, however, is the determination of the

the specific tribe.”).
12. See, e.g., Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 25, 4 Stat. 733; see also Carole
Goldberg, Members Only? Designing Citizenship Requirements for Indian Nations, 50 U.
KAN. L. REV. 437, 446 (2002).
13. HOUSE COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, MINORITY REPORT ON LAND IN SEVERALTY
BILL, H.R. REP. NO. 46-1576, at 7–10 (1880), reprinted in AMERICANIZING THE
AMERICAN INDIANS 122 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973); see also Schmidt, supra note
5, at 5 (“Wholesale American Indian allottees were released from their restrictions
of selling their land, thus opening up millions of acres to European settlers.”).
14. Goldberg, supra note 12, at 447.
15. Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, § 19, 48 Stat. 984, 988
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 5129 (2012)).
16. Schmidt, supra note 5, at 6 (describing how the IRA restored many
processes that established Sovereign Nations).
17. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55–56 (1978).
18. See, e.g., MINN. CHIPPEWA TRIBE CONST. art. II, § 1(c) (1964).
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individual Sovereign Tribal Nation.19 As Nations pre-dating the
existence of the United States, tribal governments maintain an
exclusive, sovereign authority to define requirements for their
citizenship.20 Just as France has no authority to define the
requirements for citizenship in the United States, the United States
has no constitutional or inherent authority to impose tribalcitizenship requirements based on a minimum amount of blood
quantum.
And yet this is precisely what the Supreme Court’s decision in
Adoptive Couple signals the Court may soon do. At oral argument and
in the majority opinion, the Adoptive Couple Court clearly questioned
whether Baby Girl could be a citizen of the Cherokee Nation, despite
the fact that her father was a citizen of the Nation, and she herself,
under the Cherokee Nation’s law, was eligible for citizenship.21
The majority opinion stated that the state supreme court’s
decision, which it reversed, read the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA) to apply to Baby Girl “solely because an ancestor [of hers]—
even a remote one—was an Indian.”22 As discussed in greater detail
below, ICWA applied to her because her father—and not an
ancestor—is a Cherokee Nation citizen, and she herself is eligible for
citizenship. ICWA’s application is not contingent upon Indian
ancestry. Indeed, many individuals, including Senator Elizabeth
Warren, either claim or have Indian ancestry but would never qualify
as an “Indian”—nor would their offspring qualify as an “Indian
child”—under ICWA because they are not eligible for citizenship in
a Tribal Nation.23 ICWA appropriately defers to a Tribal Nation’s
definition of “membership” for purposes of defining “Indian” under
federal law and fulfilling the federal government’s trust
responsibility to tribal citizens.24
Of course, by substituting the political reality of citizenship in a
Tribal Nation with “ancestry,” the Adoptive Couple majority purports
19. 25 U.S.C. § 5123.
20. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 55–56 (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118
U.S. 375, 381 (1886)) (“Although no longer ‘possessed of the full attributes of
sovereignty,’ [Indian Nations] remain a ‘separate people with the power of
regulating their internal and social relations.’”).
21. See CHEROKEE NATION CONST. art. IV, § 1 (2006).
22. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013).
23. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(3)–(4); see also Garance Franke-Ruta, Is Elizabeth Warren
Native American or What?, THE ATLANTIC (May 20, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com
/politics/archive/2012/05/is-elizabeth-warren-native-american-or-what/257415.
24. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(3)–(4).
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to create a racial classification that simply does not exist. It is not
clear, under the Adoptive Couple majority opinion, how closely related
to a “full blood” Indian the Court would require an individual to be
in order to qualify as a tribal citizen under federal law; all that is clear
is that Baby Girl’s blood quantum is not sufficient for the Supreme
Court to affirm her right to citizenship in a Sovereign Tribal Nation.
This conclusion alone is cause for alarm.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Adoptive Couple marks a
distinct departure from Congress’s post-IRA determination that the
federal government would defer to a Tribe’s definition of its own
citizenship requirements for the purpose of defining “Indian” under
federal law, regardless of race or blood quantum.25
And perhaps ironically, the Court’s Adoptive Couple decision has
inspired a series of subsequent attacks on ICWA as an
unconstitutional race-based classification. In A.D. v. Washburn26 and
National Council for Adoption v. Jewell,27 two non-Indian organizations,
the Goldwater Institute and National Council for Adoption,
respectively, have filed suit purportedly on behalf of Indian children,
asserting that the definition of “Indian child” under ICWA
constitutes a racial classification that violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as applied to the federal
government through the Fifth Amendment.28
Those who now attack ICWA focus their arguments on the
allegedly minimal, or apparently insufficient, blood quantum of the
Indian children on whose behalf they purport to sue.29 Just as the
proponents of imposing a minimum blood quantum requirement in
the Allotment Acts asserted their efforts were made for the benefit of
Indians, the National Council and Goldwater Institute organizations
claim that their efforts to challenge the constitutionality of ICWA are
being undertaken to help Indian children.30 And although the
National Council and Goldwater Institute lawsuits include many
allegations mischaracterizing the mechanics of how various ICWA
provisions apply to Indian children, this article will focus solely on
25. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2565.
26. A.D. v. Washburn, No. 2:15-CV-01259-NVW, 2017 WL 1019685, at *3 (D.
Ariz. Mar. 16, 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-15839 (9th Cir. Apr. 26, 2017).
27. Nat’l Council for Adoption v. Jewell, 156 F. Supp. 3d 727 (E.D. Va. 2015).
28. Complaint ¶¶ 5, 6, 7, 53, 65, 106–28, Nat’l Council for Adoption, 156 F. Supp.
3d 727 (No. 1:15-cv-00675-GBL-MSN) [hereinafter Nat’l Council Complaint].
29. Id. at ¶ 9.
30. Id. at ¶ 7; Goldwater Litigation Complaint, supra note 3, at ¶ 117.
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the lawsuits’ suggestions that certain Indian children do not have
sufficient “Indian blood” to qualify as “Indian” under federal law
without violating their rights under the United States Constitution.
Accordingly, this article will explore the origins of these
lawsuits’ theoretical underpinnings—specifically, this article will
trace National Council and the Goldwater Institute’s attempts to
preclude individuals without a minimum amount of blood quantum
from qualifying as “Indian” under federal law back to the Allotment
Era, when the federal government first imposed minimum blood
quantum requirements to transfer tribal lands from Tribal Nations
to non-Indian ownership.
Part II of this article will demonstrate that, for the first hundred
years of the United States’ existence, federal law did not define
“Indian” beyond citizenship in a Tribal Nation.31 And although
proponents of the race-based argument today tether their
arguments to the Fourteenth Amendment, this article will make
clear that classifying American Indians as a “race”—as opposed to
classifying them as citizens of Tribal Nations that enjoy a sovereignto-sovereign relationship with the federal government—finds no
support in the Fourteenth Amendment, and as a result, federal laws
that use “Indian” as a criterion in no way violate equal protection
principles.32
Part III will articulate the manner in which the federal
government, during the Allotment Era, began to impose minimum
blood quantum requirements to determine tribal citizenship.33 From
1887 through the Termination Era of the 1950s, the federal
government used minimum blood quantum requirements to
remove tribal lands, and tribal citizens, from the jurisdiction and
sovereign authority of Tribal Nations.34
In Part IV, the article will explore the debates surrounding the
IRA’s definition of “Indian” and, ultimately, demonstrate that the
IRA marked a shift away from the assimilationist/elimination
policies of the Allotment Era and toward restoring the inherent right
of Tribal Nations to define their own citizenship.35 Part IV will
further detail the legislative history and purpose behind ICWA, an
important example of a federal statute that post-dates the IRA and
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See infra Sections II.A–II.B.
See infra Sections II.A–II.B.
See infra Sections III.A–III.B.
See infra Sections III.A–III.B.
See infra Sections III.A–III.B.
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affirms that “Indian” constitutes, under federal law, a political
designation of citizenship in a Tribal Nation—and not a racial
identity.36
Part V of the article will examine the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Morton v. Mancari and Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, wherein the
Supreme Court affirmed that “Indian” under federal law is a
political—and not racial—classification that upholds the inherent
right of Tribal Nations to define their own citizenship, regardless of
any minimum amount of blood quantum.37
Finally, Part VI of the article will reveal the ways in which the
Court’s decision in Adoptive Couple, as well as the lawsuits brought by
National Council and the Goldwater Institute, recycle—or return
to—the harmful concept first promoted during the Allotment Era.
If these lawsuits succeed and the Supreme Court agrees to impose a
minimum blood quantum requirement for citizenship, at a certain
point, citizens of Tribal Nations will no longer be able to give birth
to future generations of tribal citizens.38 Indeed, the attacks on
ICWA’s constitutionality threaten nothing less than what the statute
was designed to protect and preserve: the continued existence of
Tribal Nations.
More than eighty years after Congress retired the harmful
policies of the Allotment Era, opponents of tribal sovereignty are
attempting to resurrect a minimum amount of blood quantum as a
basis for exterminating tribal sovereignty. Indeed, National Council
and the Goldwater Institute’s use of arguments predicated on “blood
quantum” today is just as disingenuous, deceptive, and harmful as
the federal government’s use of it in implementing the Allotment
Acts. And thus, the idea that at a certain point a tribal citizen will not
have enough “Indian blood” to be an “Indian child” under ICWA
threatens to take federal law and policy back several decades to the
Allotment Era, a time when the federal government stripped Tribal
Nations of their inherent right to define tribal citizenship—
regardless of race or blood quantum—under federal law.

36.
37.
38.

See infra Sections III.A–III.B.
See infra Sections V.A–V.B.
See infra Sections VI.A.–VI.B.
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II. THE ORIGINS OF “INDIAN” AS A POLITICAL REFERENCE TO
CITIZENSHIP UNDER FEDERAL LAW
[I]n many instances, children with only a minute quantum
of Indian blood and no connection or ties to the tribe are
subject to ICWA and relegated to the tribe’s exclusive or
concurrent jurisdiction.
—Complaint, A.D. v. Washburn (July 6, 2015)39
A.

The Absence of Blood Quantum in Tribal and Federal Laws Pre-1887

For the first one hundred years of the United States’ existence,
and prior to the enactment of the Allotment Acts, the federal
government—and the majority of Tribal Nations—did not define
“Indian” based on anything close to a minimum amount of “blood
quantum.”40 Instead, “Indian,” under federal law, was a political
designation signifying citizenship in a Tribal Nation.41
The manner in which the United States originally recognized
“Indians” under federal law—as citizens of Sovereign Tribal
Nations—was not reliant on a minimum amount of blood
quantum.42 That is, for a little over one hundred years, the newly
formed United States largely viewed “blood quantum” as irrelevant
in the context of its sovereign-to-sovereign relationship with Indian
Nations.43
The legal insignificance of “blood quantum” before the
Allotment Acts is further underscored by the fact that any treaties
referencing mixed-blood or half-breed Indians existed purely within
a context that recognized these individuals as members of the
various Tribes, entitled to rights under the treaties with their
respective Tribal Nations.44 That is, when the United States initially
signed treaties with Tribal Nations, the United States respected the
39. Goldwater Litigation Complaint, supra note 3, ¶ 42.
40. Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood Quantum in Federal Indian Law to 1935,
51 S.D. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006).
41. See Berger, supra note 10, at 1177.
42. Spruhan, supra note 40, at 9.
43. See id.
44. See, e.g., 1865 Treaty with the Omaha, 14 Stat. 667 (granting lands in
severalty to “members of the Tribe, including their half or mixed blood relatives”);
1836 Treaty with the Menominee, 7 Stat. 506 (making allowance for “relatives and
friends of mixed blood . . . as chiefs shall hereafter designate”); 1805 Treaty with
the Sauk and Foxes, 7 Stat. 84 (making provisions for “their mixed and half
bloods”).
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right of Tribal Nations to define their own citizenship, regardless of
whether a respective Tribe based its citizenship on blood quantum
or allowed individuals with no “Indian blood” to become citizens.45
Consequently, many treaties signed between Tribal Nations and the
United States affirm that an “Indian” could include individuals with
no American “Indian blood” or ancestry.46 For instance, the Treaty
with the Choctaw and Chickasaw in 1866 states that “citizens by
adoption or intermarriage . . . or who may hereafter become such”
are recognized, and treated, as tribal citizens because the Tribal
Nations recognize them as such.47
The absence of a specified amount of blood quantum in the
treaties signed between Tribal Nations and the United States carries
more than academic significance. A Tribal Nation’s ability to count
individuals with little to no “Indian ancestry” as political citizens of
its Nation had legal ramifications.48 Because the treaties obligated
the United States to perform certain duties, such as distributing
annuities or rations,49 the absence of a blood quantum requirement
in treaties obligated the United States to provide these duties to a

45. The 1892 Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs states,
In dealing with Indian matters the Government has treated with Indian
[N]ations, tribes or bands as solid bodies politic, and, prior to 1871, so
far as individuals composing them have been concerned, in the same
manner as it would with any foreign power; that is, through treatymaking power. The individuals of the tribe or nation have not been
known in our dealings with the tribe—as for instance, all persons
recognized by the Indian authorities as members of the Sioux Nation,
whether full-bloods, half-breeds, mixed bloods, or whites, have been
treated as the Sioux Nation, and rights have vested under treaties and
agreements in half-breeds, mixed bloods, and whites that can not be
taken away or ignore by the Government[.]
1892 COMM’R INDIAN AFFAIRS ANN. REP. 36.
46. See, e.g., 1866 Treaty with the Seminole, 14 Stat. 755 (stating that “the laws
of said nation shall be equally binding upon all persons of whatever race or color,
who may be adopted as citizens or members of said tribe”); 1866 Treaty with the
Cherokee, 14 Stat. 799 (recognizing the Cherokee Nation’s “exclusive jurisdiction
in all civil and criminal cases . . . in which members of the nation, by nativity or
adoption, shall be the only parties”); 1856 Treaty with the Creeks, 11 Stat. 699
(acknowledging Tribe’s jurisdiction over “white persons . . . by adoption”); 1842
Treaty with the Wyandot, 11 Stat. 581 (granting allotments to select individuals “and
their heirs all of whom are Wyandotts by blood or adoption”).
47. 1866 Treaty with the Choctaw and Chickasaw, art. 26, 14 Stat. 769.
48. Spruhan, supra note 40, at 27.
49. 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty, art. 10, 15 Stat. 635.
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greater number of individuals, including those with no Indian blood
or ancestry.50 In 1877, the Indian Commission recognized this much
when reflecting on the fact that individuals with no Indian blood
would be legally considered “Indian” for purposes of administering
the United States’ duties and obligations created by the 1868 Treaty
of Fort Laramie signed with the different bands of the Sioux
Nation.51 In an 1877 annual report titled “Status of Whites and
Mixed-Bloods,” the Commissioner reported,
It seems pretty clear that the Department recognizes
mixed-bloods as generally entitled to the rights of fullblood Indians; this should carry with it corresponding
restrictions. . . .
The status of whites living among the Indians is even more
anomalous than that of the mixed-bloods. It appears that
the Department has consented that all those whites who
were living among the Indians at the time of the treaty of
1868 shall receive annuities and rations so long as they
conduct themselves properly.52
In practical effect, the federal government’s inclusion of whites
living within a Tribal Nation’s borders as tribal citizens for purposes
of administering the treaty increased the amount of annuities the
United States paid pursuant to the treaty. But in a legal sense, the
aforementioned federal interpretation established a precedent of
respect for tribal sovereignty and the inherent right of Tribal Nations
to define their own citizenship, regardless of race or blood
quantum.53
The Commissioner recognized not only that whites living within
Tribal Nations’ borders would count as “Indians” for purposes of
interpreting treaties with Indian Nations, but moreover, that treaties
50. See Schmidt, supra note 5, at 4 (“Although federal officials were aware of
the use of blood quantum to trace ancestry, it was infrequently employed. . . .
[B]lood quantum only became important as a method to defining tribal
membership in the early twentieth century when it was firmly rooted in federal
Indian policy . . . .”).
51. See 1877 COMM’R INDIAN AFFAIRS ANN. REP. 69–70.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Jessica Bardill, Tribal Sovereignty and Enrollment Determinations, NAT’L
CONGRESS AM. INDIANS, http://genetics.ncai.org/tribal-sovereignty-and-enrollment
-determinations.cfm (last visited Dec. 22, 2017) (noting that in 2010 the United
States signed the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
which states that “Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the structures
and to select the membership of their institutions in accordance with their own
procedures”).
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unquestionably encompassed “mixed-bloods,” with no reference to
excluding those whose ancestry was not exclusively or sufficiently
“Indian.”54 Such references to individuals with mixed blood and
mixed ancestry were not uncommon, as “[r]eferences in treaties to
‘half-bloods,’ ‘half-breeds,’ or ‘quarter-bloods’ began in 1817 in
provisions granting various benefits to mixed individuals.”55 For
instance, the 1847 Treaty with the Chippewa of the Mississippi and
Lake Superior stated,
It is stipulated that the half or mixed bloods of the
Chippewas residing with them shall be considered
Chippewa Indians, and shall, as such, be allowed to
participate in all annuities which shall hereafter be paid to
the Chippewas of the Mississippi and Lake Superior, due
them by this treaty, and by the treaties heretofore made
and ratified.56
The inclusion of mixed-bloods as “Indians” with no reference to
a minimum blood quantum, therefore, established that although
“blood quantum was a linguistic description of ancestry in these
[nineteenth century] discussions, there was no legal significance
attributed to it.”57
The absence of a minimum blood quantum requirement in the
treaties signed by the United States and Tribal Nations was no
accident. Yet at the same time that the federal government declined
to use a specified amount of blood quantum to define “Indian” or
tribal citizens in treaties and under federal law, many states used
specified amounts of blood quantum as a basis for denying Indians
their rights under state law.58 Through the passage of many laws,
ordinances, and codes, states relied on particular amounts of blood
quantum to “declare[] certain persons ineligible to testify in court
proceedings [and/or] marry whites.”59
Virginia became the first state to codify laws relying on blood
quantum in 1785, when the state used blood quantum to define a
“mulatto.”60 In 1866, Virginia expanded its statutory use of blood
54. See 1877 COMM’R INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 51, at 69–70.
55. Spruhan, supra note 40, at 10.
56. 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 568 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904).
57. Spruhan, supra note 40, at 10.
58. See id. at 5 n.24 (citing nineteenth-century state laws barring persons with
one-half or more of Indian blood from marrying a white person or testifying at trial
with a white person as a party).
59. Id. at 4–5.
60. Id. at 5; id. at 5 n.20 (citing Act of Jan. 5, 1785, ch. 78, 1785 Va. Acts. 1, 61
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quantum to include a definition of “Indian” such that under Virginia
law, “Indian” would constitute “every person, not a colored person,
having one-fourth or more of Indian blood.”61 And many states
preceded Virginia with blood quantum laws that defined Indians at
a specific amount of blood quantum in order to deny them certain
rights, including North Carolina (1837),62 Indiana (1841),63 and
California (1851).64
States’ contemporaneous reliance on a specified amount of
blood quantum to strip individual Indians of due process and rights
under the law renders the federal government’s nineteenth century
rejection of blood quantum as a basis for defining “Indian” under
federal law all the more remarkable. Certainly, the federal
government’s dismissal of blood quantum as a legal definition of
“Indian” was no accident or oversight; instead, it was a conscious
decision made evident by the numerous federal statutes passed
before 1887 that declined to define “Indian” based on blood
quantum and thereby refrained from displacing the inherent right
of a Tribal Nation to define its own citizenship.65 For instance, the
Indian Country Crimes Act, passed in 1834, extends the laws of the
United States to Indian Country, except for crimes committed by an
“Indian” against another “Indian.”66 The statute, however, contains
no definition of “Indian.”67 Likewise, the Major Crimes Act of 1885
contains no definition of “Indian,” despite basing its application on
the defendant’s status as an “Indian.”68
The complete lack of any federal definition for “Indian” prior
to 1887 evidences an intent to respect the inherent right of Tribal

(defining a quantum of at least one-fourth African American blood to be deemed a
“mulatto”)).
61. Id. at 5 n.20 (citing Act of Feb. 27, 1866, ch. 17, § 1, 1866 Va. Acts 84).
62. See id. at 5 n.24 (citing Act of Jan. 21, 1837, ch. 8, 1836–37 N.C. Sess. Laws
30 (requiring contracts to be signed by a “Cherokee Indian or any person of
Cherokee Indian blood, within the second degree”)).
63. See id. (citing Act of Feb. 3, 1841, ch. 51, § 4, 1840–41 Ind. Acts 134 (General
Laws, 25th Sess.) (addressing sheriff’s authority to take a person into custody who
was considered one-eighth or more Indian)).
64. See id. (citing Act of Apr. 29, 1851, ch. 5, § 394(3), 1851 Cal. Stat. 51, 114
(barring those of one-fourth or more Indian blood from being a witness in an action
or proceeding)).
65. Id. at 8.
66. See id. at 18 (citing Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 25, 4 Stat. 733).
67. See id. (citing § 25, 4 Stat. 733).
68. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385.
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Nations to define their own citizenship, even when a Tribal Nation’s
citizenship statute encompasses whites or others with no “Indian
blood” or Indian ancestry living within the Nation’s borders.69
B.

Congress Purposefully Excluded “Indians”—Citizens of Tribal
Nations—from the Fourteenth Amendment
In [Adoptive Couple v.] Baby Girl, the United States and
others pressed an interpretation of ICWA that the Court
concluded “would put certain vulnerable children at a
great disadvantage solely because an ancestor—even a
remote one—was an Indian,” an interpretation that “would
raise equal protection concerns.”
—Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,
A.D. v. Washburn (Nov. 13, 2015)70

Today, the National Council and Goldwater Institute actions
assert that the Fourteenth Amendment precludes the federal
government from classifying “Indians” based on citizenship in a
Tribal Nation, an argument that does not follow the very foundation
upon which equal protection was created and incorporated into the
United States Constitution. Clinging to the dicta authored by the
Supreme Court in Adoptive Couple, the newfound ICWA challengers
make citizenship in a Tribal Nation focus on a remote connection to
a phantom Indian ancestor.71 At the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s passage—and today, as well—citizenship in a Tribal
Nation constitutes a political relationship with a separate Sovereign
Nation.72 It is not, as the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment
69. See CHEROKEE CONST. art. III, § 5 (amended 1866) (including through
amendment native-born Cherokee in its citizenry, as well as all Indians and whites
legally members of the Nation by adoption).
70. Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 1, A.D. v.
Washburn, No. 15-cv-01259-PHX-NVW (D. Ariz. filed Nov. 13, 2015) (emphasis
added) (quoting Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013)), appeal
docketed, No. 17-15839 (9th Cir. Apr. 26, 2017).
71. See Clint Bolick, Native American Children: Separate but Equal?, HOOVER INST.
(Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.hoover.org/research/native-american-children
-seperate-equal,
reprinted
in
GOLDWATER
INST.
(Nov.
2,
2015),
http://goldwaterinstitute.org/en/work/topics/constitutional-rights/equal
-protection/native-american-children-separate-but-equal/ (“[ICWA] applies to
children who have only a smidgeon of Native American blood, and even to children
who have never set foot on an Indian reservation.”).
72. See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977); Morton v. Mancari,
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repeatedly articulated, a “racial classification” within the context of
equal protection.73
It was within the first one hundred years of the fledgling United
States federal government that the United States amended its
Constitution to add the Fourteenth Amendment with what is now
known as the Equal Protection Clause.74 A review of the legislative
history of the Amendment, as well as the Supreme Court precedent
interpreting its application to citizens of Tribal Nations,75 reveals
that the authors explicitly considered and rejected drafting the
Amendment so that it would apply to citizens of Tribal Nations.
Because the authors explicitly excluded “Indians” from the
Fourteenth Amendment’s reach, nothing in the Amendment
prohibits the United States from implementing federal law that
classifies citizens of Tribal Nations as “Indians.”76
The authors’ exclusion of “Indians” was based on their
understanding that “Indian” refers to individual citizens of separate,
Sovereign Nations with which the United States signed treaties and
engaged in other sovereign-to-sovereign government-based
relations.77 The authors of the Fourteenth Amendment thus
understood that, in a legal sense, “Indian” refers to citizenship in a
Tribal Nation—not race, or even ancestry.78 Consequently, although

417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974). See generally S. REP. NO. 41-268, at 2 (1870) (discussing the
effect of the Fourteenth Amendment on Indian Tribes and noting that “it was never
claimed or pretended that [Indians] had lost their respective nationalities, their
right to govern themselves, the immunity which belongs to nations in the conduct
of war, or any other attribute of a separate political community”).
73. See Kate Shearer, Comment, Mutual Misunderstanding: How Better
Communication Will Improve the Administration of the Indian Child Welfare Act in Texas,
15 TEX. TECH ADMIN. L.J. 423, 424 n.9 (2014) (citing Barbara Ann Atwood,
Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a New Understanding of State Court
Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 593 (2002)) (“[B]eing Native American is a political,
rather than racial, classification . . . .”).
74. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
75. See, e.g., Morton, 417 U.S. at 555; Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 102–03 (1884).
See generally Earl M. Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment and Native American Citizenship,
17 CONST. COMMENT. 555 (2000) (discussing Native American citizenship status and
congressional debates regarding how the Fourteenth Amendment would affect it).
76. See S. REP. NO. 41-268, at 1 (1870).
77. See Spruhan, supra note 40, at 9 (noting that the United States government
originally formed treaties with Indian Tribes and recognized their sovereignty).
78. See Joseph P. Kalt & Joseph William Singer, Myths and Realities of Tribal
Sovereignty: The Law and Economics of Indian Self-Rule 13 (Harvard Project on Am.
Indian Dev., Joint Occasional Papers on Native Affairs No. 2004-03, 2004),
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the Fourteenth Amendment “was intended to recognize the change
in the status of the former slave which had been effected during the
war, . . . it recognizes no change in the status of the Indians.”79
To be sure, the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended to eradicate all forms of invidious racial discrimination in
the states (and through the incorporation of the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause, in the United States federal government).80 As
the Supreme Court has explained, “the central purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination
emanating from official sources in the States.”81 The Supreme Court
reached this conclusion based on its reading of the Equal Protection
Clause, concluding that based on this clause, “the Fourteenth
Amendment [commands] that no State shall ‘deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’”82 As Justice
O’Connor espoused in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., “the
intentions of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment [were] to
place clear limits on the states’ use of race as a criterion for legislative
action, and to have the federal courts enforce those limitations.”83
Thus, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Bolling v. Sharpe in
1954, the Court has repeatedly interpreted the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as prohibiting states from
using race-based classifications to deny individuals equal protection
under the law based on the authors’ admonition that the Fourteenth
Amendment was to apply to “every human being, no matter what his
complexion.”84 The Fourteenth Amendment’s authors, however,
made clear that the Amendment was not to prohibit governments
from using “Indian” as a criterion for legislation because Indian
Tribes were “recognized at the organization of this Government as

https://hpaied.org/sites/default/files/publications/myths.pdf (“Federal law and
treaties recognize tribal sovereignty and obligations to Indian [N]ations, not to
Indians as a racial group.”).
79. S. REP. NO. 41-268, at 10 (1870) (emphasis added).
80. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (citing Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)); Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499 (holding that the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporates the same equal protection duties
against the federal government that apply to states under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
81. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 192.
82. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18 (1971).
83. 488 U.S. 469, 491 (1989) (emphasis added).
84. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1640 (1862).
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independent sovereignties”85 and were therefore kept outside the
bounds of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The exclusion of “Indians” from the Fourteenth Amendment,
therefore, was both purposeful and calculated. The exclusion of
“Indians” was based on the authors’ respect for tribal sovereignty and
the fact that Tribal Nations, as Sovereign Nations, have the inherent
right to define their own citizenship, regardless of race, rendering
the classification of their citizens as “Indians” a political and not a
racial classification.86
Ultimately, the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment
excluded “Indians” from the Fourteenth Amendment’s reach based
on (1) respect for tribal sovereignty, (2) the right of Tribal Nations
to define their own citizenship, and (3) the need for the federal
government to use “Indians” as a criterion to identify the citizens of
a Tribal Nation with whom the United States must fulfill its treaty
obligations and duties.87
Many senators evinced their respect for Tribal Nations as
separate Nations during the debates that led to the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment, including Senator Howard, who notably
stated, “Indians born within the limits of the United States, and who
maintain their tribal relations, are not, in the sense of this
amendment, born subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
They are regarded, and always have been in our legislation and
jurisprudence, as being quasi foreign nations.”88 Senator Howard
went even further, explaining that the Constitution, in particular the
Indian Commerce Clause, required Congress to respect Indian
Nations as separate Nations and stating,
The Government of the United States ha[s] always
regarded and treated the Indian tribes within our limits as
foreign Powers, so far as the treaty-making power is
concerned, and so far especially as the commercial power
is concerned, for in the very Constitution itself there is a
provision that Congress shall have power to regulate
commerce, not only with foreign nations and among the
States, but also with the Indian tribes. That clause, in my

85. Id. at 1639.
86. See Shearer, supra note 73, at 424 n.9 (“[B]eing Native American is a
political, rather than racial, classification . . . .”).
87. See Berger, supra note 10, at 1179.
88. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., lst Sess. 2890 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Howard).
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judgment, presents a full and complete recognition of the
national character of the Indian tribes, the same character in
which they have been recognized ever since the discovery
of the continent and its occupation by civilized men; the
same light in which the Indians were viewed and treated by
Great Britain from the earliest commencement of the
settlement of the continent. They have always been
regarded, even in our ante-revolutionary history, as being
independent nations, with whom the other nations of the
earth have held treaties . . . .
[I]t has been the habit of the Government from the
beginning to treat with the Indian tribes as sovereign Powers.
The Indians are our wards. Such is the language of the
courts. They have a national independence. They have an
absolute right to the occupancy of the soil upon which they
reside; and the only ground of claim which the United
States has ever put forth to the proprietorship of the soil of
an Indian territory is simply the right of preemption; that
is, the right of the United States to be the first purchaser
from the Indian tribes. We have always recognized in an Indian
tribe the same sovereignty over the soil which it occupied as we
recognize in a foreign nation of a power in itself over its
national domains. They sell the lands to us by treaty, and
they sell the lands as the sovereign Power owning, holding,
and occupying the lands.89
The debates over the Fourteenth Amendment in the Senate
further clarified that the founding of the United States had not
stripped Tribal Nations of their inherent sovereignty over their
lands, their citizens, or their communities. As one senator noted,
[A]lthough the Indians were thus overshadowed by the
assumed sovereignty of the whites, it was never claimed or
pretended that they lost their respective nationalities, their
right to govern themselves, the immunity which belongs to
nations in the conduct of war, or any other attribute of a
separate political community.90
The authors’ respect for the inherent right of Tribal Nations to
define their own citizenship regardless of race or anything close to
blood quantum is further evidenced by the authors’ reference to the
right of Tribal Nations “to regulate their domestic affairs,” or as one
senator asserted,
89.
90.

Id. at 2895 (emphasis added).
S. REP. NO. 41-268, at 2 (1870).
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Their right of self government, and to administer justice
among themselves . . . has never been questioned; and
while the United States ha[s] provided by law for the
punishment of crimes committed by Indians straggling
from their tribes, and crimes committed by Indians upon
white men lawfully within the reservations, the
Government has carefully abstained from attempting to
regulate their domestic affairs, and from punishing crimes
committed by one Indian against another in the Indian
country.91
Ultimately, the senator asserted that because Congress—and
the Constitution—recognized Indian Nations as separate Nations,
the Fourteenth Amendment could not alter an Indian Nation’s right
to define its own membership.92
Furthermore, the authors’ decision to exclude “Indians” was
borne out of adherence to the hundreds of treaties the United States
signed with Indian Nations, as ratified by the Senate.93 Article VI of
the Constitution renders these treaties the “supreme Law of the
Land,” and as such, the Fourteenth Amendment’s authors knew that
the United States was constitutionally obligated to fulfill its trust
duties and obligations to Tribal Nations—a command that would
require the United States Congress to use “Indian” as a criterion in
federal legislation and policy. Because “Indian” constituted a legal
term used in nineteenth-century federal Indian law to describe a
citizen of a Tribal Nation, the authors of the Fourteenth
Amendment never intended for the Amendment’s prohibitions on
the use of race as a criterion to prohibit the federal government from
enacting legislation that relies on “Indian” as a classification.94
Repeatedly, the Senate made clear that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not include or apply to “Indians” because the
United States could not constitutionally “annul the treaties
previously made between [Indian Nations] and the United States.”95
Specifically Senator Carpenter, sitting on the Judiciary Committee,
stated, “[I]n the opinion of your committee the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment to the Constitution has no effect whatever upon the
status of the Indian Tribes within the limits of the United States, and

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 10.
See id. at 10–11.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
See infra notes 95–102 and accompanying text.
See S. REP. NO. 41-268, at 1.
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does not annul the treaties previously made between them and the
United States.”96 The Senate’s reverence for the sanctity of treaties
signed with Indian Nations is due, in part, to the Senate’s
recognition that many treaties came into existence before the
Constitution was adopted.97 As one senator noted during the
debates,
[Several of the treaties came about] prior to the adoption
of the Constitution. In each and every [one] of these
treaties, the Indians are treated as states, or communities
capable of entering into and performing the duties
imposed by treaty obligations. They are treaties of peace;
and made to cement friendship between the United States
and the parties of the other part, respectively.98
The Senate further understood that “because [many] treat[ies]
stipulate[] for many actions,”99 like the distribution of annuities
and/or rations to tribal citizens, prohibiting the use of “Indian” as a
criterion in legislation would strip Tribal Nations of their right to
define their own citizenship in the treaties they signed with the
United States and would thus “depriv[e] the tribes of their character
as a nation or political community.”100 That is, the Senate
acknowledged that oftentimes a “treaty stipulates for many actions
. . . which can only be performed by a separate community” defined
by federal law as “Indians.”101
Because “Indians” were excluded from the Fourteenth
Amendment’s reach, they were not granted United States citizenship
under the Fourteenth Amendment.102 Less than two decades later,
in 1884, the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment and concluded that the Amendment did not make
“Indians” United States citizens because the Amendment explicitly
excluded Indians based on their political classification; that is, the
Court concluded that the legal term “Indians” refers to members of
“distinct political communities”—Tribal Nations—and does not
refer to a classification based on race. 103 As a result, Indians did not

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
See id. at 2–4.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 1–3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10–11.
Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99–100 (1884).
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become citizens of the United States until Congress passed the
Indian Citizenship Act in 1924.104
The irony of the arguments employed by National Council and
the Goldwater Institute in their attacks on ICWA today is that if
National Council and these organizations were to win, and
congressional classifications of “Indian” were deemed
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, then the very
congressional act that granted Indians citizenship in the United
States would be rendered unconstitutional. Indeed, a conclusion by
the Supreme Court that “Indian child” under ICWA constitutes an
impermissible race-based classification would call into question the
entirety of federal Indian law dating back to the founding of the
United States, at which time the United States entered into treaty
agreements with Tribal Nations that required Congress to pass
legislation identifying citizens of those Nations as “Indians.”105
III. THE USE OF BLOOD QUANTUM TO IMPLEMENT THE ALLOTMENT
ACTS
Baby girl A.D., on information and belief, has more than
50% non-Indian blood.
—Complaint, A.D. v. Washburn (July 6, 2015)106
After more than a century of deferring to a Tribe’s right to
define its citizenship, federal policy changed at the turn of the
twentieth century. Under the pretext of protecting Indians and
making Indians “equal” to other United States citizens—mirroring
the very arguments asserted by those who challenge ICWA today—
Congress decided that Tribal Nations should be broken up and
Indians should be treated as individuals, rather than as citizens of
Tribal Nations.107
The 1880s ended decades of forced Indian removals, which had
opened up hundreds of millions of acres of tribal lands for white
104. See Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 153 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(b) (2012)).
105. See Kalt and Singer, supra note 78, at 13 (“The reality is that tribal
sovereignty is not based on race, but is a recognition of the numerous sovereign
nations that were in the land settled by the European colonists. Federal law and
treaties recognize tribal sovereignty and obligations to Indian [N]ations . . . .”).
106. Goldwater Litigation Complaint, supra note 3, ¶ 9.
107. See generally General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–333 (1887)) (repealed 2000).
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settlement.108 Suddenly, however, the federal government realized
forced removals and restricting tribal lands to reservations were not
enough to satisfy America’s quest for land. Following removal, the
“discovery” of minerals and resources on reservations created an
insatiable appetite for access to the lands on reservations, and tribal
governments stood in the way of manifest destiny.109 Something new,
besides forced removal, would be necessary to open up tribal lands
on reservations to white settlement and business development.110
The Allotment Acts, beginning with the General Allotment Act
of 1887 (known as the “Dawes Act”), were Congress’s solution.
Under the Dawes Act, Congress authorized the allotment of tribal
lands within a reservation to individual Indians in amounts
established by treaty, statute, or executive order.111 After a Tribal
Nation’s land was divided and allotted among its individual citizens,
the Secretary of the Interior was further authorized to purchase
lands not allotted within a Tribe’s reservation boundaries for the
purpose of opening these surplus lands to white settlers.112
It was through the implementation of the Allotment Acts that
the federal government first used “blood quantum” to define
“Indian” under federal law.113 Although the Allotment Acts did not
themselves define “Indian” for purposes of allotting tribal lands on
reservations, the Acts afforded Indian agents and the Commissioner
108. “Indian removal” began with the Indian Removal Act of 1830 and
continued for decades. See Ethan Davis, An Administrative Trail of Tears: Indian
Removal, 50 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 49, 52 (2008) (“On May 28, 1830, months of
acrimonious debate culminated in the passage of the Indian Removal Act. . . . The
president would have unrestrained authority to survey and subdivide millions of
acres west of the Mississippi as he saw fit. The removal and mass emigration of tens
of thousands of human beings would occur when, where, and how Jackson
decreed.”).
109. See TASK FORCE FOUR: FED., STATE, AND TRIBAL JURISDICTION, REPORT ON
FEDERAL, STATE, AND TRIBAL JURISDICTION: FINAL REPORT TO THE AMERICAN INDIAN
POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION 111–12 (1976) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT],
https://www.narf.org/nill/documents/icwa/federal/lh/76rep/76rep.pdf
(“In
response to extreme pressure from whites for access to Indian lands and mineral
riches, Congress passed the General Allotment Act of 1887.”).
110. See Schmidt, supra note 5, at 4–5 (discussing how the United States
government took various actions to allow for increased white settlement).
111. General Allotment Act § 1.
112. Id. at § 5.
113. See Schmidt, supra note 5, at 4 (“The allotment era (1887–1934) saw the
concept of blood quantum become officially integrated into the legal status of
Indian identity . . . .”).

824

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:4

of Indian Affairs—pursuant to any rules and regulations that the
Secretary of the Interior might promulgate—the responsibility of
determining who constituted an “Indian” and should therefore
receive an allotment on a particular reservation.114
Thus, it was through the Allotment Acts that the federal
government successfully removed millions of acres of land from
tribal governments and ceded them to states and settlers.115 The
Dawes Act and its progeny116 were nothing less than an attempt to
dismantle tribal governments, eliminate tribal citizenship, and
ultimately transfer lands from Indian to non-Indian control. It was,
in a very practical sense, the solution to what Senator Wheeler
described as the “Indian problem.”117
Indeed, the Allotment Acts mark the first instance wherein
“Congress . . . beg[a]n to deal with [Indians] as individuals, and not
only as nations [or] tribes.”118 Identifying “Indians” as individuals
with a certain pedigree of blood quantum, instead of as citizens of
Tribal Nations, was a significant step in the federal attempt to
eliminate Tribal Nations altogether.119

114. General Allotment Act § 3.
115. The Indian Reorganization Act—75 Years Later: Renewing Our Commitment to
Restore Tribal Homelands and Promote Self-Determination: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. 31 (2012) (statement of Sen. Tom Udall, Member, S.
Comm. on Indian Affairs).
116. Following the Dawes Act, Congress passed a good number of subsequent
amendments and additional acts, all of which served to extend the allotment to
additional Tribal Nations and ultimately remove provisions of the Dawes Act that
were intended to protect the interests of Indians, such as restrictions against
alienation of allotted land until after twenty-five years.
117. Senate Committee Hearing on Self-Government, supra note 2, at 100 (statement
of Sen. Burton K. Wheeler, Chairman of the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs).
118. Miller Opinion, supra note 9. The Dawes Act
mark[ed], as was observed by Acting Attorney-General Jenks in his
opinion of July 27, 1888, “a new epoch in the history of the Indians,
namely, that in which Congress has begun to deal with them as
individuals, and not only as nations, tribes, or bands, as heretofore. It is
the dismemberment of the tribes or bands, and absorption, as citizens,
of the individuals composing them by the States and Territories
containing the lands on which such individuals settle or may be settled,
that is the policy of the new legislation.”
Id.
119. See Schmidt, supra note 5, at 6–7 (discussing how blood quantum
requirements potentially threaten Native American identity and the continued
existence and recognition of Tribal Nations).
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In today’s context, the National Council and Goldwater
Institute actions seek to do the same. By supplanting citizenship in a
Tribal Nation with the concept of “remote Indian ancestry” or
insufficient blood quantum, these lawsuits seek to effectively impose
a minimum blood quantum necessary for citizenship in a Tribal
Nation. For instance, the re-classification of an Indian child citizen
as an individual with a certain amount of blood quantum, as the
Goldwater Institute120—and the Supreme Court in Adoptive
Couple121—seeks to do, reinvigorates the policies of assimilation and
annihilation that originated in the Allotment Era. That is, both reclassify tribal citizens as individuals who can no longer politically
associate with their Tribal Nations.122 Both, if taken to their logical
end, seek to eliminate Tribal Nations altogether.123
A.

The Purpose of the Allotment Acts Was to Take Land and Dismantle
Tribal Governments

The Allotment Acts, beginning with the Dawes Act, constituted
Congress’s attempt to placate the insatiable appetite of white settlers
and the United States federal government for land. As Senator
Dawes, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs and
sponsor of the Dawes Act, stated, “The greed of these [white] people
for the land has made it utterly impossible to preserve it for the
Indian.”124 Furthermore, according to the Secretary of the Interior,
Carl Schurz, Tribal Nations stood in the way of American progress
and “development.”125 Six years before the passage of the Dawes Act,
he stated,
I am profoundly convinced that a stubborn maintenance
of the system of large Indian reservations must eventually
result in the destruction of the red men . . . . What we can
and should do is . . . allot[] to them lands in severalty . . .
in such a manner that they no longer stand in the way of
120. See generally Goldwater Litigation Complaint, supra note 3.
121. See generally Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
122. See Sarah Krakoff, They Were Here First: American Indian Tribes, Race, and the
Constitutional Minimum, 69 STAN. L. REV. 491, 545 (2017).
123. Id.
124. PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE LAKE MOHONK
CONFERENCE OF FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN (1887), reprinted in AMERICANIZING THE
AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 13, at 109 (statement of Sen. Henry L. Dawes).
125. CARL SCHURZ, PRESENT ASPECTS OF THE INDIAN PROBLEM (1881), reprinted in
AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 13, at 14.
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the development of the country as an obstacle, but form
part of it and are benefitted by it.126
Thus, what was initiated as a means to transfer tribal lands from
Tribal Nations to white settlers suddenly transformed into a
benevolent effort to “benefit” Indians by making them “individual
property owners” such that their Tribal Nations no longer controlled
the lands.127 As Secretary Schurz further explained,
When the Indians are so settled, and have become
individual property-owners . . . the Indians will occupy no
more ground than so many white people; the large
reservations will gradually be opened to general settlement
and enterprise, and the Indians, with their possessions, will
cease to stand in the way of the “development of the
country.” The difficulty which has provoked so many
encroachments and conflicts will then no longer exist.128
Despite all of the rhetoric about the benefits that “Indians”
would receive from assimilation with non-Indians, a review of the
Dawes Act reveals that opening the land up to white settlement was
the true motivation behind the Allotment Acts.129 A group of
representatives in the House voiced their opposition to the
legislation, and their statements provide a grim picture of the real
purpose behind the legislation. For instance, one member opposed
the bill, stating,
The main purpose of this bill is not to help the Indian, or
solve the Indian problem, or provide a method for getting
out of our Indian troubles, so much as it is to provide a
method for getting at the valuable Indian lands and
opening them up to white settlement. . . .
The real aim of this bill is to get at the Indian lands and
open them up to settlement. The provisions for the
apparent benefit of the Indian are but the pretext to get at
his lands and occupy them. With that accomplished, we
have securely paved the way for the extermination of the
Indian races upon this part of the continent. If this were
done in the name of Greed, it would be bad enough; but
to do it in the name of Humanity, and under the cloak of
126. Id.
127. See id. at 20 (arguing that transferring land to individual Indians was
necessary for their absorption into “the great body of American citizenship”).
128. Id.
129. See generally General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–333 (1887)) (repealed 2000).
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an ardent desire to promote the Indian’s welfare by making
him like ourselves, whether he will or not, is infinitely
worse.130
As one Senator put it, those who supported the Dawes Act were
simply “in favor of despoiling the Indians and appropriating their
lands and treating them harshly and unjustly.”131
B.

1887: The Dawes Act Allotted Tribal Lands to “Indians” Without
Defining “Indian”

Congress passed the Dawes Act following several failed attempts
at similar legislation.132 For years, Congress had discussed the best
approach to “civilize” Indians into mainstream America and
eliminate tribal governments.133 In the Dawes Act, Congress
ultimately settled on a policy of assimilation that sought to dismantle
tribal governments; turn their citizens into farmers with individual
ownership over portions of the Tribal Nations’ former lands; and
finally, subject citizens of Tribal Nations—Indians—to state and
territory laws by granting them United States citizenship, which was
something the Fourteenth Amendment decidedly did not do.134
Specifically, the Dawes Act
• broke up the land on reservations that Tribal Nations owned
through the “allot[ment of] lands in severalty . . . to
individual Indian[s]”;135

130. HOUSE COMM’N ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, MINORITY REPORT ON LAND IN SEVERALTY
BILL, H.R. REP. NO. 46-1576, at 7–10 (1880), reprinted in AMERICANIZING THE
AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 13, at 128.
131. 11 CONG. REC. 780–81, 783, 934–35 (1881), reprinted in AMERICANIZING THE
AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 13, at 131 (debate in the Senate on bill for lands in
severalty to Indians); see also Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably Political: Race, Membership and
Tribal Sovereignty, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1041, 1068 (2012).
132. FRED A. SEATON & ELMER F. BENNETT, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 775 (1958).
133. See Brian Sawers, Tribal Land Corporations: Using Incorporation to Combat
Fractionation, 88 NEB. L. REV. 385, 390 (2009); Chris Edwards, Indian Lands, Indian
Subsidies, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, DOWNSIZING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(Feb. 1, 2012), https://www.downsizinggovernment.org/interior/indian-lands
-indian-subsidies.
134. H. Exec. Doc. No. 1, pt. 5, vol. 1, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., at 25–27 (1887),
reprinted in AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 13, at 111 (statement
of Sec’y of the Interior L.Q.C. Lamar).
135. General Allotment Act § 1, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 331–333 (1887)) (repealed 2000).
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stipulated that Indians could not alienate their allotted land
for a twenty-five-year period in which the “United States . . .
[was to] hold the land thus allotted . . . in trust for the sole
use and benefit of the Indian to whom such allotment shall
have been made,” and “any conveyance . . . of the lands . . .
or contracting made touching the same, before the
expiration of the [twenty-five-year trust period] . . . [would]
be absolutely be null and void”;136
• conferred United States citizenship on Indians at the time
they received their allotment patent and “subject[ed them]
to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory
. . . [where] they . . . reside[d]”;137and
• authorized the Secretary of the Interior to “negotiate with
. . . tribe[s] for the purchase and release . . . of such portions
of its reservation not allotted as such tribe shall, from time
to time, consent to sell . . . [for the] purpose of securing
homes to . . . settlers.”138
Furthermore, the Dawes Act specifically exempted a number of
Tribal Nations from its purview, including the Five Civilized
Tribes,139 and included provisions governing an allotment’s
partition and descent, which would prove to be problematic.140
Ultimately, the Dawes Act took lands belonging to Tribal
Nations and divided them up into “allotments”—the most common
being 160 acres in size—and then distributed them to the Nation’s
citizens, or as the Act instructs, “individual Indians.”141 Any land
leftover after this distribution was ripe for purchase by the Secretary
of the Interior from the Tribe for white settlement within reservation
boundaries.142
•

136. Id. § 5.
137. Id. § 6.
138. Id. § 5.
139. Id. § 8. The Five Civilized Tribes would eventually be enveloped in the
allotment system. With the Act of March 3, 1893, Congress created the Five Civilized
Tribes Commission (Dawes Commission) and tasked its commissioners with
negotiating with the Five Civilized Tribes for the “extinguishment of the national or
tribal title to any lands with that Territory now held by any and all of such nation or
tribes.” 1900 COMM’N TO THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES ANN. REP. 55.
140. Mark Welliver, Comment, CP 87 and CP 100: Allotment and Fractionation
Within the Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 2 N.M. TRIBAL L.J. (2001).
141. See generally General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388.
142. See id. § 5; South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 345 (1998);
Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 473 (1984); Bryan T. Andersen, Case Note, South
Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe: Sewing a Patchwork Quilt of Jurisdiction, 3 GREAT PLAINS
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The Dawes Act, however, did not define “Indian.”143 The lack of
a statutory definition for “Indian” was consistent with the prevailing
view that an Indian was not to be defined by federal law, but rather
defined by citizenship in a Tribal Nation. In this regard, the Dawes
Act of 1887 echoed the past hundred years of federal policy wherein
the federal government acknowledged the exclusive right of Tribal
Nations to define their own citizenship. The plain language of the
Dawes Act, therefore, recognized that “Indian” constituted a
political term contingent upon a Tribal Nation’s political
recognition. In James Thayer’s article on the passage of the Dawes
Act published in the October 1891 issue of the Atlantic Monthly, he
described the unique status of Indians as follows:
He who tries to fix and express their legal status finds very
soon that he is dealing chiefly with their political condition
. . . . What makes any of them peculiar, in a legal point of
view, is the fact that they belong to a separate political body,
and that our government mainly deals with them, not as
individuals, as it does with you and me, but in a lump, as a
people or a tribe.144
And yet, despite the prevailing norms that recognized a Tribal
Nation’s right to define its own membership, regardless of blood
quantum, and the attendant legal implications thereto, the Dawes
Act provided a foundation that granted broad authority to the
Secretary of the Interior to further the Act’s objectives—most
importantly, the elimination of tribal governments.145 It was in
pursuit of this objective that blood quantum was eventually

NAT. RESOURCES J. 99, 105 (1998).
143. See John P. LaVelle, The General Allotment Act “Eligibility” Hoax: Distortions of
Law, Policy, and History in Derogation of Indian Tribes, 14 WICAZO SA REV. 251, 257
(1999).
144. James B. Thayer, A People Without Law, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1891, at
540, https://unz.org/Pub/AtlanticMonthly-1891oct-00540?View=PDF.
145. Miller Opinion, supra note 9, at 561 (“[The Dawes Act] mark[s], as was
observed by Acting Attorney-General Jenks in his opinion of July 27, 1888, ‘a new
epoch in the history of the Indians, namely, that in which Congress has begun to
deal with them as individuals, and not only as nations, tribes, or bands, as
heretofore. It is the dismemberment of the tribes or bands, and absorption, as
citizens, of the individuals composing them by the States and Territories containing
the lands on which such individuals settle or may be settled, that is the policy of the
new legislation.’” (internal citation omitted)).
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incorporated into the federal framework known today as the
Allotment Era.146
Thus, because the Dawes Act did not define “Indian” for the
purpose of effectuating the Act, and because the policy of the United
States had shifted to recognizing Indians as individuals rather than
citizens of Tribal Nations, the years immediately following the
passage of the Dawes Act were met with inconsistent interpretations
of who constituted an Indian “within the meaning of the laws of the
United States.”147
For instance, in 1892, in response to a case in which a mixedblood Santee Sioux woman was denied status as an “Indian” under
common-law principles because her father was white, the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Thomas Morgan, proposed a list of
determinative factors that he believed controlled who qualified as
“Indian” under federal law. He suggested a definition that did not
limit “Indians” to those of a particular race, but instead encompassed
“mixed bloods,” as well as those with no Indian blood but recognized
as tribal citizens through tribal adoption or marriage to a tribal
citizen.148 Commissioner Morgan explained that “Indian” should not
be defined by race, but instead should include
Member[s] of one of the several nations, tribes, or bands
of native Americans . . . who owe allegiance, primarily, to
one of these political communities; and secondarily, if at
all, to the United States[,] . . . one who is by right of blood,
inheritance, or adoption, entitled to receive the pro rata
share of the common property of the tribe[,] . . . white men
. . . adopted into Indian tribes, and in accordance with the
customs of those tribes became recognized by the
authorities thereof as members and entitled to all the rights
therein that the members of the Indian blood were entitled
to and enjoyed.149
In fact, Commissioner Morgan recommended that the federal
government “recogniz[e] as Indians full bloods, half-breeds and
mixed bloods without distinction” or reference to a minimum
amount of blood quantum.150 In Commissioner Morgan’s view, to
otherwise impose such limitations on who could qualify as an

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See Krakoff, supra note 131, at 1067–68.
1892 COMM’R INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 45, at 33–37.
Id. at 33–36.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 36.
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“Indian” under federal law could call into question the legitimacy of
the treaties the United States had signed with Tribal Nations, many
of which were signed by citizens of Tribal Nations that were not “full
bloods.”151 It was thus for legal reasons that Morgan urged that the
definition of an Indian “be construed in its historical and not in its
ethnological significance.”152
The absence of a definition for “Indian” was not the Dawes Act’s
only shortcoming. The legislation was passed hastily and applied in
a one-size-fits-all manner to numerous Tribal Nations.153 But this
approach contravened Senator Dawes’s own view on what would be
essential to the long-term success of the allotment system and,
ultimately, the solution to the Indian Problem: time.154 Senator
Dawes understood that “[t]he greed of [settlers] for the land . . .
made it utterly impossible to preserve it for the Indian[;]” however,
he believed the allotment system should be implemented only as
Indians had the knowledge and resources to make use of their
individual allotments.155 He explained that it was his understanding
that “President Cleveland . . . did not intend, when he first signed
the bill, to apply it to more than one reservation at first . . . which
[Dawes] thought was very wise[,]” yet within the same year of its
passage, the Act had been applied to break up the lands of several
Indian Nations.156
Because the Dawes Act was flawed from the beginning—in form
and in application—and because the Dawes Act provided for certain
“protections” that prevented Indians from alienating their
allotments—which in turn impeded the immediate availability of
tribally-owned lands for white settlement—Congress quickly enacted
subsequent amendments to change the terms of the Act.157 These
amendments removed previous restrictions on alienation of the
land, including the early conveyance of fee simple title from the
federal government to the individual Indian, rendering the land
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. The Dawes Act exempted some Tribal Nations, including the Five Civilized
Tribes, from its application. See supra note 139.
154. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE LAKE MOHONK
CONFERENCE OF FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN (1887), reprinted in AMERICANIZING THE
AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 13, at 100–10 (statement of Sen. Henry L. Dawes).
155. Id. at 109.
156. Id. at 107.
157. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 671–73, 872–76 (1984).
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subject to state laws and taxes.158 With every amendment and
subsequent allotment act, from 1888 to 1908, Congress moved
further away from its historical understanding that “Indians”
constitute citizens of Tribal Nations and closer to the conception
that to be “Indian” one must have a certain degree of “blood
quantum.”159
158. Id.
159. Examples of the Amendments Congress passed in this fashion include: Act
of Aug. 9, 1888, ch. 818, 25 Stat. 392 (prohibiting white men not otherwise members
of an Indian Tribe prior to August 9, 1888, from acquiring through marriage to an
Indian woman rights to tribal property, tribal privilege, or any other interest to
which tribal members are entitled, but with no application to the Five Civilized
Tribes); Act of Feb. 28, 1891, ch. 384, 26 Stat. 794 (amending the Dawes Act to
modify the size of allotments moving forward, authorizing the Secretary of the
Interior to lease individual allotments where individuals, “by reason of age or
disability,” cannot put their allotments to use, and clarifying that descent can be
determined based on cohabitation “according to the custom and manner of Indian
life” for purposes of marriage); Act of Aug. 15, 1894, chs. 289–90, 28 Stat. 286
(authorizing United States circuit courts to exercise jurisdiction and determine,
where disputed, if an individual who “in whole or in part of Indian blood or descent”
is entitled to land under any allotment act, but exempting the Five Civilized Tribes
and the Quapaw Tribe); Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat. 62 (establishing that
children from a solemnized marriage between a white man and an Indian woman
who are tribal members by blood are entitled to the same rights and privileges of
the mother’s Tribe as any other member of the Tribe); Act of May 31, 1900, ch. 598,
31 Stat. 221 (adding “inability” to the basis for which the Secretary of the Interior
may lease an individual’s allotment, where leases had previously been limited to
instances where individuals “by reason of age or disability” could not make use of
their allotments); Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 832, 31 Stat. 1058 (holding that rolls made
by the Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes are final and that the names on such
rolls “alone constitute the several tribes which they represent,” and granting the
Secretary of the Interior authority to grant rights of way through any lands held by
Tribal Nations or individual Indian allotments and providing that allotments “may
be condemned for any public purpose under the laws of the State or Territory where
located” and “money awarded” to allottee for condemnation); Act of May 27, 1902,
ch. 888, 32 Stat. 245 (providing adult heirs of a deceased Indian the ability to sell or
convey lands inherited that otherwise had restrictions upon alienation); Act of May
8, 1906 (Burke Act), ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (providing release from restricted status
on allotment for any Indian deemed competent and amending the Dawes Act to
grant Indians citizenship upon receipt of fee simple patent, or land ownership
without restriction, rather than upon receipt of allotment in restricted status); Act
of June 21, 1906, ch. 3504, 34 Stat. 325 (removing restriction on allotments held by
adult mixed-blood Indians of the White Earth Reservation, while keeping
restrictions on allotments in place for full-blood members of the White Earth
Reservation, with restriction being removed and allotment’s title in fee simple
passing only upon a determination of competency); Act of Mar. 1, 1907, ch. 2285,
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In this regard, the Allotment Acts took more than tribal lands:
they took the inherent right of Tribal Nations to define their own
requirements for citizenship.
C.

Congress Passed the Curtis Act in 1898

The Curtis Act of 1898 was a direct affront to the Five Civilized
Tribes who had vehemently protested the authority of the “Dawes
Commission” that Congress created in 1893.160 The Curtis Act went
a step further than the Dawes Act in attempting to eliminate tribal
governments.161 Not only did the Curtis Act apply an allotment
system to the Cherokee Nation, Choctaw Nation, Chickasaw Nation,
Creek Nation, and Seminole Nation, it also provided for the
abolition of Tribal Courts and, through “agreements” with these
Tribes, the dissolution of tribal governments.162 The Act gave the
existing Dawes Commission the requisite authority over the Five
Civilized Tribes to create membership rolls—by which the federal
government would determine who was, and who was not, a citizen of
one of the Five Civilized Tribes and therefore an “Indian” under the
Act.163 The Act also provided for the incorporation of towns and
municipalities in Indian Territory under the laws of the State of
Arkansas, abolished all Tribal Courts in Indian Territory, and

34 Stat. 1015 (granting “noncompetent Indians” the ability to sell or convey
allotments with restrictions under terms and conditions provided by Secretary of
the Interior).
160. Judy Kuhlman, Curtis Act Presages Statehood, NEWSOK (Apr. 24, 1994),
http://newsok.com/article/2464122.
161. M.
Kaye
Tatro,
Curtis
Act
(1898),
OKLA. HIST. SOC’Y,
http://www.okhistory.org/publications/enc/entry.php?entry=CU006 (last visited
Dec. 22, 2017).
162. The Curtis Act differed in application to each of the Five Civilized Tribes
based on agreements the federal government reached with each of the Tribes that
were incorporated into the Act. For instance, the terms of the Atoka Agreement
applied to Choctaws and Chickasaws and provided for allotments of 320 acres for
each member of these Nations but also called for the abolition of each of these tribal
governments to make way for statehood. PRUCHA, supra note 157, at 753; see also
ANGIE DEBO, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CHOCTAW REPUBLIC 289 (1934). Meanwhile,
Cherokees were to receive allotments of 110 acres, Creeks 160 acres, and Seminoles
120 acres. PRUCHA, supra note 157, at 754. Each of the Agreements incorporated
into the Curtis Act was negotiated between the Tribes and the Dawes Commission.
163. Tatro, supra note 161.
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prohibited the enforcement of tribal laws in the courts of the United
States in Indian Territory.164
Given the opposition from the Five Civilized Tribes to the Dawes
Commission, Congress made sure to spell out the Dawes
Commission’s authority over the allotment of the Five Civilized
Tribes’ lands.165 In doing so, Congress vested the Commission with
incredibly broad authority, authority that extended far beyond the
bounds of the Dawes Act. That is, Congress vested the Dawes
Commission with the authority to determine who would be a citizen
of a Tribal Nation for any and all purposes, not just allotment. As
section 21 of the Curtis Act states, the rolls created by the Dawes
Commission would “alone constitute the several tribes which they
represent.”166 The Curtis Act, therefore, effectively barred Tribal
Nations from determining membership beyond the scope of those
listed on the final rolls.167
In addition to limiting tribal citizenship to the final rolls
developed by the Dawes Commission, the Act immediately
condemned the laws of Tribal Nations, abolished all Tribal Courts,
and effectively signaled the end of tribal governments in Indian
Territory.168 The Curtis Act was passed with statehood in mind, and
the proponents of statehood viewed tribal governments as
impediments to what would one day become the State of
Oklahoma.169 Accordingly, the Act banned the “laws of the various
tribes or nations [of Indians] . . . [from being] enforced at law or in
equity by the courts of the United States in the Indian Territory”170
and further stated that

164. Act of June 28, 1898, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495; see Kirke Kickingbird, “Way Down
Yonder in the Indian Nations, Rode My Pony Cross the Reservation!” From “Oklahoma Hills”
by Woody Guthrie, 29 Tulsa L.J. 303, 319 (1993).
165. Tatro, supra note 161.
166. § 21, 30 Stat. 495.
167. Id.; see also Spruhan, supra note 40, at 5–7 (noting that the creation of tribal
rolls that detailed “degree of relationship” or “blood quantum” was not a new
concept, but the use of the Commission’s rolls to subsequently determine legal
rights based on blood quantum was).
168. See PRUCHA, supra note 157, at 257 (arguing that the Curtis Act was
“‘entitled an act for the protection of the people of the Indian Territory,’ [and] was
[a] unilateral action by the United States that signaled the end of the tribal
governments”).
169. Id. at 757.
170. § 26, 30 Stat. 495.
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all tribal courts in Indian Territory shall be abolished, and
no officer of said courts shall thereafter have any authority
whatever to do or perform any act theretofore authorized
by any law in connection with said courts, or to receive any
pay for same; and all civil and criminal causes then pending
in any such court shall be transferred to the United States
court in said territory by filing with the clerk of the court
the original papers in the suit . . . .171
From 1898, when the Curtis Act was first passed, to 1919,
roughly 13,110,532 acres of former tribal lands were opened for
white settlement.172
D.

The Acts of April 21, 1904, and May 27, 1908, Further Served to
Open Lands to Settlement in Oklahoma

Six years after the Curtis Act, demand for tribal lands once again
propelled Congress into action. Although the Dawes Act and Curtis
Act had successfully transferred millions of acres from Tribal Nations
to white settlers, the protections that both Allotment Acts afforded
Indians—specifically the protections that prohibited an Indian from
selling his or her land—were preventing a large number of white
settlers from purchasing (or taking) Indian owned lands.173 In order
to quell tensions related to the lack of open land that accompanied
the massive influx of settlers onto reservations,174 Congress passed
the Act of April 21, 1904, and removed “all the restrictions upon the
alienation of lands of all allottees of either of the Five Civilized Tribes
of Indians who [were] not of Indian blood.”175
Two years later, Oklahoma became a state, and at the insistence
of the Oklahoma Congressional Delegation, Congress again moved
to eliminate additional restrictions, this time by identifying tribal
members whose blood constituted less than one-half Indian blood
and lifting the restrictions on their lands so their lands could be sold

171. Id. § 28.
172. PRUCHA, supra note 157, at 753–54; see also DEBO, supra note 162, at 903.
173. See PRUCHA, supra note 157, at 257–60. Specifically, in Indian Territory, the
Curtis Act resulted in more than 15 million acres, out of the nearly 19.5 million
acres surveyed as the lands belonging to the Five Civilized Tribes, being allotted to
individual Indians. Id. Because of the relatively small amount of surplus lands made
available for white settlers through the allotment of Indian Territory, there was a
push to have restrictions against alienation on the allotments removed. Id.
174. See id. at 753; see also DEBO, supra note 162, at 902.
175. Act of April 21, 1904, ch. 1402, 33 Stat. 180.

836

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:4

to white settlers.176 The Act of May 27, 1908, was therefore passed in
response to expressed concerns that the “protections” in the original
Dawes Act impeded continued western expansion.177 Representative
Charles D. Carter, a Congressmen from the newly established
Oklahoma delegation,178 lamented that “restrictions have proven in
the past a constant and successful barrier to the progress and
development of [Oklahoma], a menace to the civilization and
advancement of the Indian and destructive of the very spirit of
American liberty.”179
Ultimately, the 1908 Act passed, and Congress removed the
restrictions, or “protections,” that prohibited the alienation of
allotment land to anyone who was “less than one-half Indian
blood.”180 In this manner, Congress formally introduced the concept
of a minimum amount of “blood quantum” to maintain one’s status
as an “Indian” under federal law, thereby adjudicating who would be
considered truly “Indian” and thus a citizen of a Tribal Nation. The
congressional goal, of course, was to remove the federal restrictions
on selling Indian-owned land in the hope that more Indians would
“sell” their land to white settlers.181 Congress’s imposition of a
minimum amount of blood quantum, however, went far beyond
removing tribal lands from tribal control. By imposing a minimum
amount of “Indian blood” necessary to be considered “Indian”
under federal law, Congress began a conversation about when
“Indians” might cease to exist at all.
E.

1906: The Burke Act and the Foundation of Using Blood Quantum to
Determine Competency

Two years after the 1904 Act, and two years before the 1908 Act,
Congress took yet another step in opening up more tribal lands for
white settlement. In 1906, Congress passed the Burke Act to ensure

176. Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 199, 35 Stat. 312.
177. History
of
Allotment,
INDIAN
LAND
TENURE
FOUND.,
https://www.iltf.org/resources/land-tenure-history (last visited Dec. 22, 2017).
178. Oklahoma became a state with the passage of the Act of June 16, 1906, ch.
3335, 34 Stat. 267.
179. 42 CONG. REC. 449 (1908) (statement of Rep. Carter).
180. See Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 199, 35 Stat. 312.
181. History of Allotment, supra note 177 (describing Congress’s interest in Indian
lands for settlement purposes, including “railroads, mining, forestry and other
industries”).
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that more “Indian” lands could pass into non-Indian hands.182 The
original restrictions in the Dawes Act prohibited Indians from
utilizing their land, by sale or lease, for twenty-five years but had also
granted Indians citizenship in the United States at the time the
allotment patent was issued.183
The Burke Act amended section 6 of the Dawes Act in two
important ways. First, the Burke Act granted citizenship at the end
of the twenty-five-year trust period or at any other time the federal
government deemed the Indian “competent” to receive the title to
his or her land in fee simple.184 Second, the Burke Act authorized
the Secretary of the Interior to remove restrictions on Indian
allotments when it could be determined that an Indian was
“competent.”185 Thus, if an Indian was found to be “competent,” the
restrictions on alienation would be lifted, and the Indian’s land
could be put up for sale or otherwise transferred to non-Indian
ownership, regardless of whether the initial twenty-five-year trust
period had run to completion.186
Specifically, the Burke Act granted the Secretary of the Interior
broad discretion in determining the competency of Indians who had
received allotments under the Dawes Act for the purposes of
removing restrictions on allotments.187 Like in the Dawes Act,
Congress did not define the standards for determining who was
“competent and capable of managing his or her affairs . . . [so as] to
be issued . . . a patent in fee simple” for his or her land.188
In the first year following the passage of the Burke Act, the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs noted that the “competency”
182. Glen Bessemer, Burke Act (1906), WORLD HIST. (Sept. 27, 2015),
http://www.worldhistory.biz/modern-history/81133-burke-act-1906.html.
183. Id.
184. Burke Act, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (1906).
185. Id.; see also PRUCHA, supra note 157, at 298.
186. One additional rationale promoted by the Department of the Interior for
removing restrictions—beyond opening up tribal lands for white settlers—was that
“Indians of less than one-half blood could be entrusted with the untrammeled
management of their lands . . . [and] Indians of less than 75 percent Indian blood
should be authorized to sell their surplus lands” due to their white parentage and
access to educational opportunities; this rationale is of course belied by the fact that
even after allotment, white settlers were still pushing for the removal of restrictions
on all Indian lands. See ANGIE DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN: THE BETRAYAL OF
THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES 139–40, 142 (discussing the pressure exerted on public
officials to remove all restrictions from Indian land allotments in 1905–1906).
187. See Burke Act, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (amending § 6 of the Dawes Act).
188. Id.
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determinations coincided with land speculation on many
reservations and ultimately resulted in “Indians [being] defrauded
out of a large portion of the value of their lands.”189 Despite the
awareness among federal officials that competency determinations
led to abuses resulting in significant land loss for individual Indians,
Congress continued enacting legislation that provided for easier
removal of restrictions to a greater number of individuals by basing
rights and restrictions on blood quantum.190
In the same year as the Burke Act was passed, Congress and the
Department of the Interior embarked on an era in which they would
define “Indians” based on a minimum blood quantum. In an attempt
to increase the tax base,191 minimize the obligations owed by the
federal government pursuant to treaties signed with Tribal Nations,
and further diminish the sovereignty of Tribal Nations, Congress
enacted legislation that (1) extended restrictions on allotments for
“full bloods”;192 (2) removed restrictions on allotments belonging to
Indians who were less than one-half Indian blood, intermarried with
a citizen of the United States, or classified as a freedman; and (3)
further released restrictions on allotments, minus the homestead,
for Indians who were between one-half and three-quarters Indian
blood.193
Suddenly, “Indian” under federal law no longer signified
membership in a Tribal Nation as defined by the Tribe itself, but
instead denoted a federally mandated minimum amount of “blood
quantum.” By redefining “Indian” to be contingent upon a threshold
degree of “blood quantum,” the federal government not only
decimated the land base of Tribal Nations, but redefined “Indian”
under federal law for the purposes of fulfilling trust obligations in a
way that was largely inconsistent with the treaties the United States
had previously signed with Tribal Nations.194

189. 1909 COMM’R INDIAN AFFAIRS ANN. REP. 63.
190. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1081 (Nell Jessup Newton ed.,
2012); see supra Section III.D (discussing the Act of April 21, 1904, and the Act of
May 27, 1908, which removed restrictions based on race and blood quantum).
191. See Spruhan, supra note 40, at 20.
192. Id.; see also Act of April 26, 1906, ch. 1876, §§ 19, 22, 23, 34 Stat. 137, 144–
45.
193. See Spruhan, supra note 40, at 20; see also Act of May 27, 1906, ch. 199, § 1,
35 Stat. 312.
194. Compare PRUCHA, supra note 157, at 753, with supra note 133 (showing how
blood quantum was not part of the original Curtis Act discussing tribal lands).
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The federal government’s substitution of a certain degree of
blood quantum for political citizenship was further cemented from
1913 to 1920, when the Department of the Interior employed a
commission to lift restrictions on allotments en masse based on
competency determinations.195 During this time, Commissioner of
Indian Affairs Cato Sells introduced an official policy for making
large-scale determinations of competency that hinged almost
exclusively on the amount of blood quantum of the individual
Indian.196 Prior to the adoption of Commissioner Sells’s policy,
competency was intended to be judged on an individual case-by-case
basis.197
Such individualized treatment of competency determinations,
however, served as a barrier to achieving what Commissioner Sells
envisioned as a time in which an “Indian” would no longer constitute
a citizen of a Tribal Nation, but instead would become a part of the
“ultimate absorption of the Indian race into the body politic of the
Nation,” something Sells referred to as “the beginning of the end of
the Indian problem.”198 In 1917, Commissioner Sells released the
Declaration of Policy in the Administration of Indian Affairs,
stipulating that “all able-bodied adult Indians of less than one-half
Indian blood . . . be given . . . full and complete control of all their
property.”199
Sells believed that the “practical application” of the policy would
“relieve from the guardianship of the Government a very large
number of Indians”200 by releasing individuals he termed as “white
Indians,”201 or Indians without sufficient blood quantum to be, in his
view, citizens of Tribal Nations. He bragged that the number of acres
transferred from Indian ownership in the “less than 18 months
[since the blood quantum policy was implemented], nearly equals
the area [transferred] during the preceding 10 years.”202 That is, the
erasure of tribal citizenship coincided with the loss of Indian-owned
lands. Based on the competency policy implemented by

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Judith Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 4–5 (1995).
See generally 1917 COMM’R INDIAN AFFAIRS ANN. REP.
See Burke Act, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (1906).
FRANCIS S. DRAKE, INDIAN HISTORY FOR YOUNG FOLKS 504 (1919).
1917 COMM’R INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 196, at 4.
Id. at 5.
1918 COMM’R INDIAN AFFAIRS ANN. REP. 19.
See id.
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Commissioner Sells, by 1928, “four-fifths of the Indians declared
‘competent’ no longer owned their land.”203
As Commissioner Sells’s ideology reveals, the goal of taking
tribal lands from Tribal Nations could not be accomplished without
breaking up the governments of the Nations themselves, and tribal
governments could not be eliminated so long as they maintained
their citizens.204 Accordingly, the use of a minimum blood quantum
in the implementation of Allotment Acts served to strip Tribal
Nations of their most basic, fundamental sovereign right: the right
to define their own citizenship.205 Of course, this served the ultimate
purpose of the Dawes Act; as the Commission of Indian Affairs in
1889 explained,
The Tribal relations should be broken up, socialism
destroyed, and the family and the autonomy of the
individual substituted. The allotment of lands in severalty,
the establishment of local courts and police, the
development of a personal sense of independence, and the
universal adoption of the English language are means to
this end.206
While the policy of taking tribal lands from Tribal Nations was
not new, the blood quantum–based competency methodology
employed in the Allotment Acts was. That is, despite hundreds of
forced removals and hundreds of broken treaties, the United States
had consistently—until the Allotment Acts—accepted that an
“Indian” under federal law constituted any individual whom a Tribal
Nation recognized as a citizen, regardless of the degree of blood
quantum maintained by the tribal citizen.
After more than a century of defining “Indian” based on
citizenship in a Tribal Nation, and more than a century of affirming
the inherent right of Tribal Nations to define their own citizenship,
regardless of race, the United States federal government, for the first
time, altered the legal definition of “Indian” to be contingent upon

203.
204.

COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 190, at 1081.
Thomas J. Morgan, Statement on Indian Policy, reprinted in AMERICANIZING THE
AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 13, at 75.
205. Steven Newcomb, The 1887 Dawes Act: The U.S. Theft of 90 Million Acres of
Indian Land, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Feb. 8, 2012),
https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/opinions/the-1887-dawes-act-the
-us-theft-of-90-million-acres-of-indian-land/ (discussing the Allotment Acts pushing
Native Americans into U.S. citizenship rather than their tribal citizenship).
206. Morgan, supra note 204, at 75.
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a minimum amount of blood quantum.207 The Allotment Acts,
therefore, sought to strip Tribal Nations of their right to govern both
their land and their citizens.208
In 1933, the new Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier,
halted the practice of using blood quantum–based competency tests
to remove restrictions on allotment lands.209 Of course by that time,
the land holdings of Indian Nations and their citizens had been
reduced by nearly 90 million acres since the Dawes Act was passed in
1887.210
In 1934, federal policy changed once again, this time restoring
the inherent right of Tribal Nations to define their own citizenship.
IV. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SOUGHT TO UNDO THE DAMAGE
CAUSED BY ALLOTMENT AND RESTORE “INDIAN” AS A POLITICAL
CLASSIFICATION UNDER FEDERAL LAW
[One] percent Indian blood is [not] enough to make them
a tribal—a tribal member, eligible for tribal membership.
—Paul Clement, Counsel for Guardian Ad Litem, Oral
Argument in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl (April 16, 2013)211
Just a few decades after the federal government first imposed a
minimum blood quantum to define tribal citizenship and opened
tribal lands for white settlement, “the policy of allotting Indian lands
was repealed with the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act.”212
In this regard, “[t]he Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 marked a
shift away from assimilation policies and toward more tolerance and
respect for traditional aspects of Indian culture,” including
promoting tribal self-government over tribal domestic affairs and

207. See Spruhan, supra note 40, at 39 (“After a century of use of blood quantum
primarily to describe, but not to define individual Indians, Congress and the BIA
applied blood quantum to release whole classes of Indian allottees from restrictions
on sales of allotments.”).
208. See generally id. (discussing how the Allotment Acts dissolved Tribes as
Sovereign Nations and how blood quantum played a role in defining “Indian” under
federal law).
209. See PRUCHA, supra note 157, at 320.
210. 1 AM. INDIAN POL’Y REVIEW COMM’N, FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 67, 318
(1977).
211. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 29 (argument of Paul
Clement, counsel for guardian ad litem, arguing for adoptive parents).
212. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 109, at 112 n.11.
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defining citizenship.213 Instead of defining “Indian” as an individual
with a certain amount of “Indian blood,” the IRA dismissed the
“blood quantum” definition that prevailed for much of the early
twentieth century and restored the federal government’s original
recognition that “Indian” legally signifies any citizen of a Tribal
Nation—regardless of a specified amount of blood quantum.214
Indeed, ICWA is one manifestation of the IRA’s shift away from
assimilation and toward restoration of tribal self-government.
As discussed in greater detail below, this shift was not completed
overnight.215 Instead, it was not until the 1970s that Congress ceased
using blood quantum as a means to achieve the extermination of
Tribal Nations, their citizens, and their governments.216 The IRA,
however, was the start.217
A.

The IRA Was Designed to Undo the Harm Caused by the Allotment
Acts

The IRA was the result of growing concern that the Allotment
Acts caused serious harm to Tribal Nations and their citizens.218 In
1926, the Secretary of the Interior formally requested that the
Institute for Government Research219 conduct a study related to
federal Indian policy, including allotment, stating that the
Department was in a need of “a constructive contribution in this
difficult field of government administration.”220 Two years later, the

213. Id. (citation and quotation omitted); see also United States v. Jicarilla
Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 180 n.8 (2011).
214. Schmidt, supra note 5, at 1–9.
215. See infra Section IV.A.
216. See infra Section IV.C.
217. See infra Section IV.A.
218. S. REP. NO. 112-116, at 4–5 (2012) (explaining that the purpose of the IRA
was to “replace assimilationist policies,” “revitalize and strengthen tribal
government,” and “reestablish [tribal] homelands”); see id. at 6 (“[R]estoration of
land to tribal ownership is one of the central purposes of the IRA and has been
recognized by Congress as essential to tribal self-determination.”); see also Hodel v.
Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 707 (1987) (stating that allotment “quickly proved disastrous
for the Indians”); Schmidt, supra note 5, at 16 (“The authors of this act intended a
few purposes, including discontinuing the use of allotments . . . .” (emphasis added)).
219. The Institute for Government Research is now known as the Brookings
Institute.
Brookings
Institution
History,
BROOKINGS,
https://www.brookings.edu/about-us/brookings-institution-history/ (last visited
Dec. 22, 2017).
220. PRUCHA, supra note 157, at 808.
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Institute released its report entitled “The Problem of Indian
Administration,” more commonly known as the Meriam Report.221
The Meriam Report gave a scathing critique of the Dawes Act
and the federal government’s relationship with Tribal Nations
generally.222 Not only had the allotment system decimated tribal land
holdings,223 it had also undermined tribal sovereignty to such an
extent that tribal citizens suffered greatly. For example, the Meriam
Report noted that the overall “health of the Indians compared with
that of the general population [wa]s bad”224 and that Indian children
were forced to attend boarding schools where “provisions for the
care of the Indian children . . . [were] grossly inadequate.”225 The
Meriam Report further concluded that “[t]he income of the typical
Indian family is low and the earned income extremely low,”226 while
also noting that as a result of the forced removals and Allotment
Acts, many tribal citizens were “living on lands from which a trained
and experienced white man could scarcely wrest a reasonable
living.”227 The Meriam Report drew significant attention to the harm
caused by the congressional effort in the Allotment Acts to eliminate
tribal governments altogether. Although Tribal Nations had survived
the Allotment Acts and assimilationist policies of the post–Dawes Act
era, many of their citizens had not.228
With mounting criticism of the Allotment Acts, in 1933,
President Franklin Roosevelt appointed John Collier to the post of
Commissioner of Indian Affairs.229 Collier immediately took it upon
himself to retire the allotment system and propose sweeping changes
designed to restore tribal sovereignty, as outlined in his initial draft
of the IRA.230 Collier saw the IRA as having a twofold purpose.231

221. Id.
222. Id. at 809–10.
223. Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property Rights and the Myth of
Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559, 1610 (2001).
224. INST. FOR GOV’T RESEARCH, MERIAM REPORT: THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN
ADMINISTRATION 3 (1928), http://www.narf.org/nill/resources/meriam.html.
225. Id. at 11.
226. Id. at 4.
227. Id. at 5.
228. See id. at 3.
229. Royster, supra note 195, at 16.
230. Id.
231. 1934 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ANN. REP. SEC’Y INTERIOR, reprinted in
FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 226 (3d ed.
2000) [hereinafter 1934 REPORT].
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First, it was intended to “end the long, painful, futile effort to speed
up the normal rate of Indian assimilation by individualizing tribal
land and other capital assets”; and second, it was intended to
“provide the means, statutory and financial, to repair as far as
possible, the incalculable damage done by the allotment policy and
its corollaries.”232
Collier’s initial draft was submitted to the House of
Representatives on February 12, 1934, as House Bill 7902, and to the
Senate the following day, February 13, 1934, as Senate Bill 2755.233
Collier’s original version of the IRA consisted of forty-eight pages,234
containing sixty-one sections.235 The final Act, however, contained
only nineteen sections.236 The draft bill encompassed Collier’s vision
for self-governing Tribes and a diminishing role for the federal
government.237 In his memorandum of law to the House concerning
his initial draft of the IRA, Collier stated, “There is no serious
question as to the constitutional capacity of Congress to grant the
various powers of self-government enumerated in” the draft
legislation.238 Collier made sure to inform Congress that the grant of
powers of tribal self-government in the IRA did not “constitute a
grant of new powers,”239 but rather, as he explained, were “a
recognition of tribal powers which Congress ha[d] never seen fit to
abrogate.”240 Collier further noted that “[t]he right of an Indian
tribe to deal with many matters affecting the lives and property of its
members ha[d] repeatedly been upheld by the federal courts,” and
ultimately, the IRA was necessary “to clarify and define the relations
of an Indian tribe to its members.”241

232. Id.
233. PRUCHA, supra note 157, at 957.
234. Id.
235. See VINE DELORIA JR., THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT: CONGRESSES AND
BILLS 8–19 (2002).
236. See id. at 20–23.
237. 1934 REPORT, supra note 231.
238. Memorandum from John Collier, Comm’r of Indian Affairs, The Purpose
and Operation of the Wheeler-Howard Indian Rights Bill, to the Senate and House
Comms.
on
Indian
Affairs
(Feb.
19,
1934),
http://cdm15019.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p4005coll11/id/513.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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In furtherance of Collier’s first noted objective of ending forced
assimilation and the abolishment of tribal governments,242 the IRA
explicitly ended the allotment practices that had resulted in the loss
of 90 million acres of tribally-owned lands since 1887.243 And
although congressional debates on the IRA presented a number of
opposing opinions as to how the IRA should proceed in form and
function, it was apparent that allotment had to stop.244 Congressman
Edgar Howard, co-sponsor of the IRA and the Chairman of the
House Indian Affairs Committee, explained,
[T]he land was theirs under titles guaranteed by treaties
and law; and when the government of the United States set
up a land policy which, in effect, became a forum of
legalized misappropriation of the Indian estate, the
government became morally responsible for the damage
that has resulted to the Indians from its faithless
guardianship.245
Reaching a consensus on Collier’s second stated objective of the
IRA of “provid[ing] the means, statutory and financial, to repair . . .
the incalculable damage done by the allotment policy and its
corollaries” was not so straightforward.246 The “incalculable damage”
left in the wake of the Allotment Acts was more than land loss: the
damage included loss of identity; loss of communities and families;
and loss of the inherent right of Tribal Nations, as sovereigns, to
unequivocally define their membership and govern their internal
domestic affairs. In the first instance, the IRA restored the ability of
Indian Nations to adopt bylaws and charters for the purpose of selfgovernance and further authorized lands being taken into trust for
tribal governments.247

242. See, e.g., Act of June 28, 1898, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 503 (subjecting tribal officials
to criminal prosecution in federal courts and mandating Tribes to be party to civil
suits in federal court concerning tribal property).
243. See Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, § 19, 48 Stat. 984,
988 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 5129); see also 1934 REPORT, supra note 231.
244. See 1934 REPORT, supra note 231
245. 78 CONG. REC. 11,728 (1934).
246. 1934 REPORT, supra note 231.
247. Id.
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The IRA’s Definition of “Indian” Restores the Inherent Right of Tribal
Nations to Define Their Own Citizenship, Regardless of a Minimum
Amount of Blood Quantum

Collier recognized that much of the harm caused by the
Allotment Acts stemmed from the federal government’s imposition
of a minimum blood quantum requirement to define “Indian”
under federal law, thereby imposing federal citizenship
requirements on Indian Nations.248 Collier further recognized that
to move away from the Allotment Acts’ harmful policies, the federal
government needed to restore the inherent right of Tribal Nations
to determine who is eligible for citizenship in their Nations,
regardless of a threshold degree of blood quantum.249
Not everyone in Congress agreed, however. There remained
numerous members of Congress who believed that limiting the legal
definition of “Indian” to individuals with a minimum amount of
“Indian blood” would lower the number of “Indians” living in the
United States to whom the United States would be required to
maintain treaty duties and obligations.250 Indeed, not all members of
Congress agreed that the “harm” of the Allotment Acts should be
remedied or that self-government of Tribal Nations should be
restored.251 Some believed that Tribal Nations should be eliminated
altogether and “Indians”—tribal citizens—should be assimilated
into the dominant white culture with no political ties to their Tribal
Nations.252
Of course, the most efficient way to eradicate Tribal Nations is
to take away their citizens.253 Suddenly, blood quantum became
more than a means to secure the transfer of tribal lands from Tribal
Nations. As Congress debated the IRA, imposing a minimum blood
quantum requirement under federal law became the means by
which many members of Congress believed the United States could
phase Tribal Nations out of legal existence.254
248. Margo S. Brownell, Who Is an Indian? Searching for an Answer to the Question
at the Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 275, 287 (2001).
249. Id.
250. See Senate Committee Hearing on Self-Government, supra note 2, at 263–64.
251. Id. at 264.
252. Id.
253. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 190, at 927–28
(“Indian naturalization was conditioned on the severing of tribal ties, renouncing
tribal citizenship, and the removal of federal protection . . . .”).
254. See Senate Committee Hearing on Self-Government, supra note 2, at 263–64
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Front and center in the debates surrounding the IRA was the
question of how the IRA would define “Indian.” As noted by Senator
Thomas from Oklahoma, the draft of the “bill, as [he] underst[oo]d
it, [applied to] any Indian on the rolls, and many of them ha[d] no
Indian blood at all.”255 Senator Burton K. Wheeler, then Chairman
of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, advocated for a
definition of “Indian” contingent upon a threshold amount of blood
quantum, so as to limit the number of people who could legally claim
to be “Indian.”256 In response to a proposed definition of “Indian,”
he argued,
As a matter of fact, you have got one-fourth in there. I think
you should have more than one-fourth. I think it should be
one-half. In other words, I do not think the Government of
the United States should go out here and take a lot of
Indians in that are quarter bloods and take them in under
the provisions of this act. If they are Indians of the half
blood then the Government should perhaps take them in,
but not unless they are. If you pass it to where they are
quarter-blood Indians you are going to have all kinds of
people coming in and claiming they are quarter-blood
Indians and want to be put upon the Government rolls, and
in my judgment it should not be done. What we are trying to
do is get rid of the Indian problem rather than add to it.257
As Senator Thomas further noted, by limiting the number of people
with sufficient “blood” to qualify as “Indian” under federal law, the
federal government would be able
to eventually disseminate them and disintegrate them and
to mix them with the white people, so that the problem
would gradually fade away like the mist. Now, that is
working fairly well among some tribes in my State. We have
great numbers of Indians there that are in every sense—I
will say white people, to make the distinction.258
Despite these arguments for limiting “Indian” under federal law
to a certain blood quantum, the final act that passed on June 18,
1934, rejected the Chairman’s request that “Indian” be limited solely
to individuals with one-half or more “Indian blood.”259 Indeed, the
(statement of Sen. Burton K. Wheeler, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. (emphasis added).
258. Id. at 152.
259. See Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, § 19, 48 Stat. 984,
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final legislation marked a dramatic shift from the legal definition of
“Indian” that emerged during the Allotment Acts and instead
recognized that an “Indian” under federal law includes anyone who
is a member of a Tribal Nation or a descendant of a member of a
Tribal Nation—regardless of degree of blood quantum. In the final
legislation, the IRA mandated,
The term “Indian” as used in this Act shall include all persons
of Indian descent who are members of any recognized tribe
now under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are
descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934,
residing within the present boundaries of any Indian
reservation, and shall further include all other persons of
one-half or more Indian blood.260
Thus, although the IRA’s definition includes individuals with
“one-half or more Indian blood,” one need not have any “Indian
blood” to qualify as an Indian under the IRA’s definition if the
individual is recognized by the Tribal Nation as a member or is the
descendant of a member. Accordingly, the IRA enshrined the
concrete principle that “Indian” under federal law is not dependent
on a quantifiable amount of blood or race, but rather is based on a
Tribal Nation’s determination that an individual is a citizen of its
body politic.261
C.

The Termination Era: Congress Once Again Uses Blood Quantum to
Eradicate Tribal Nations

Although the IRA marked a dramatic shift away from using
blood quantum to define “Indian” under federal law, the
congressional shift was not complete until the 1970s. In the 1950s,
just two decades after the passage of the IRA, Tribal Nations once
again faced federal policies geared towards termination of Tribal
Courts, tribal governments, and tribal citizens. During the 1950s
Termination Era, Congress returned to its use of blood quantum to
define “Indian” under federal law.
In the 1950s Termination Era, Congress passed legislation in an
effort to rid the federal government of its trust responsibility owed
to Tribal Nations by eliminating “all federal supervision and control

988 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 5129 (2012)).
260. Id. (emphasis added).
261. Approximately 181 Tribes have adopted constitutions pursuant to the IRA.
3 DEP’T OF INTERIOR ANN. REP. 1, 376 (1946).
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over Indians” at the “earliest practicable” date.262 Specifically, on
August 1, 1953, the House of Representatives passed House
Concurrent Resolution 108, which articulated the congressional
purposes behind termination as follows: (1) to subject Indians to all
the laws, privileges, and responsibilities that were applicable to every
non-Indian United States citizen, specifically, state laws and taxation;
(2) to end the “ward” status of Indians and Tribes; (3) to grant to
Indians “all rights and prerogatives pertaining to American citizens”;
and (4) to free Tribal Nations and their individual members from
“Federal supervision and control and from all disabilities and
limitations applicable to Indians.”263
Thus, just as the desire for tribal lands was characterized as
freeing and “civilizing” the Indian in the Dawes Act, the desire to
eliminate tribal governments altogether in the Termination Era was
characterized as a benevolent exercise in granting rights to Indians.
The consequences of the Termination Era, however, were severe.
Within a year of House Concurrent Resolution 108, Congress had
approved and passed legislation providing for the termination of
seventy Indian Nations, declaring them to no longer be federally
recognized.264 Tribal Nations that lost federal recognition status
suffered the consequences of fractured governments, land loss, and
the imposition of state governance on tribal lands.265 The
elimination of federal recognition meant that their citizens were no
longer, under federal law, “Indian.”266
During this Termination Era, Congress imposed a threshold
amount of blood quantum to secure the demise of several Tribal
Nations. For instance, in 1954, the federal government declared that
any Utes with less than fifty-one percent Ute blood would be
terminated from citizenship in the Ute Tribe; the federal
government agreed, however, to continue to recognize full-blood
Utes as legitimate tribal citizens.267 Once again, the most efficient
way to eliminate a Nation is to eliminate its citizens. And once again,
Congress realized that imposing a minimum amount of blood
262. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 190, at 89; see
also H.R. REP. NO. 82-2503 (1952).
263. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 190, at 90.
264. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong. (1953).
265. See Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, THE AM.
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July 8, 1970), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2573.
266. See id.
267. Ute Partition Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 671, 68 Stat. 868.

850

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:4

quantum for tribal citizenship quickened the elimination process of
tribal governments altogether.
Within a short number of years, public outcry against Congress’s
termination acts informally ended the Termination Era; however,
the damage was already done.268 Approximately three percent of the
Indian population had been terminated from federal recognition
and 1,365,801 acres of trust lands were withdrawn and released to
non-Indian control.269 It was not until the Nixon Administration that
the Executive Branch officially and formally repudiated
termination,270 and it was not until 1988 that Congress officially
repudiated its termination acts altogether.271
Thus, although the IRA marked a return to a recognition that
“Indian” is a political and not merely racial classification under
federal law, the Termination Era demonstrates that although the
IRA initiated a restoration of tribal sovereignty, this restoration, in
the 1950s, was not yet complete. The Termination Era was shortlived, however. Just two decades later, in the 1970s, Congress and the
federal government finally—and fully—affirmed the inherent right
of Tribal Nations to define their own citizenship regardless of degree
of blood quantum.
D.

Post-Termination Era, the Federal Government Has Consistently
Refused to Impose a Minimum Blood Quantum to Define “Indian”
Under Federal Law

After the Termination Era in the 1950s subsided, and since the
early 1970s, federal law has consistently defined “Indian” as a citizen
of a Tribal Nation and not—as it was defined in the Allotment Acts—
a percentage of a blood quantum. For instance, in 1975, Congress
enacted hallmark legislation affirming the inherent sovereignty of
Tribal Nations when it passed the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act of 1975 (ISDEAA). This legislation
provided Tribal Nations with the opportunity to enter into contracts
with the federal government and take over administration of
programs and functions that the federal government was otherwise
obligated to provide as a result of the United States’ treaty duties and
268.
269.
270.
271.

See PRUCHA, supra note 157, at 1058.
Id. at 1058–59.
See Nixon, supra note 265.
THOMAS CLARKIN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW AND POLICY
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATIONS 1961–1969, at 271 n.3 (2001).
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obligations, such as education and health and social services.272 The
ISDEAA supported a Tribal Nation’s own determination of how best
to serve its members. This was in direct contradiction to the mindset
promulgated in the Allotment Acts, wherein tribal governments
were viewed as incompetent, inferior, or simply institutions to be
eliminated. The ISDEAA recognized that citizens of Tribal Nations
had been denied
an effective voice in the planning and implementation of
programs for the benefit of Indians which are responsive
to the true needs of Indian communities; and [that] the
Indian people will never surrender their desire to control
their relationships both among themselves and with nonIndian governments, organizations, and persons.273
That is, after several decades of federal policy designed to eradicate
tribal governments, Congress reached the conclusion that Indians—
the citizens of Tribal Nations—would never accept or allow the
termination of their political affiliations with their governments.
Most notably, the ISDEAA completed the shift away from using
a minimum blood quantum as a method for defining “Indian” under
federal law. The Act defines an Indian as “a person who is a member
of an Indian tribe.”274 The ISDEAA contains no discussion of a
minimum amount of blood quantum necessary to render oneself an
“Indian” under the law. Thus, by 1975, “Indian” under federal law
was once again a political, not racial, designation.
Following the ISDEAA, Congress passed numerous other acts
that likewise defined “Indian” as dependent upon citizenship in a
federally recognized Tribe. The following are examples of such acts:
• The Indian Land Consolidation Act (ILCA), the purpose of
which was to reduce fractionated interests in allotments by
authorizing the acquisition of lands in trust for individual
Indians and consolidating them into tribal ownership. ICLA
defines an Indian as “any person who is a member of any
Indian tribe, is eligible to become a member of any Indian
tribe, or is an owner (as of October 27, 2004) of a trust or

272. See Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub.
L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203; see also Geoffrey D. Strommer and Stephen D. Osborne,
The History, Status, and Future of Tribal Self-Governance Under the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 4 (2015).
273. Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act § 2(a)(1)–(2).
274. Id. § 4(a).
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restricted interest in land” with no mention of a minimum
blood quantum.275
• The Indian Child Protection and Family Violence
Protection Act (Protection Act), the purpose of which was
to reduce the incidents of child abuse and family violence
in Indian Country. The Protection Act defines an Indian as
“any individual who is a member of an Indian tribe” with no
mention of a minimum blood quantum.276
• The Indian Employment, Training and Related Services Act
(IETRSA), the purpose of which was to provide resources
that assist Tribal Nations in improving the effectiveness of
services provided to tribal citizens. That is, IETRSA sought
to “reduce joblessness in Indian Country” and further
support the “policy of self-determination.”277 IETRSA states
that an Indian is “a person who is a member of an Indian
tribe” with no mention of a minimum blood quantum.278
• The Indian Health Care Improvement Act (IHCIA), the
purpose of which was to address the “unmet health needs of
the American Indian people”—categorized as “severe”—
and the health status of Indians, which continued to be “far
below that of the general population.”279 IHCIA defines
Indian to be “any person who is a member of an Indian
tribe” with no mention of a minimum blood quantum.280
The Indian Child Welfare Act is yet another example of a
federal statute that post-dates the IRA and affirms that under federal
law, “Indian” constitutes a political designation of citizenship in a
Tribal Nation and not a racial identity. Congress passed ICWA in
1978 to address a crisis involving the separation of Indian children
from their families and Tribal Nations that, because of its
magnitude, threatened the very existence of Tribal Nations as selfgoverning, separate Sovereign Nations.281
275. 25 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012) (passed in 1983 and subsequently amended several
times for constitutional reasons related to the taking of property).
276. Id. §§ 3201–3202 (passed in 1990).
277. Id. § 3401 (passed in 1992).
278. Id. § 3402 (passed in 1992 and amended in 2000) (citing the definition of
“Indian” in the ISDEAA, 25 U.S.C. § 5304(d)).
279. Id. § 1601(5) (passed in 1976 and subsequently amended in 1992 and
2010).
280. Id. § 1603(13) (passed in 1976 and subsequently amended several times).
281. “As early as 1973, the Senate Committee on Interior and Subcommittee on
Indian Affairs began to receive reports that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian
children were being separated from their natural parents through the actions of
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ICWA Constitutes Yet Another Example of the Federal Government’s
Contemporary Use of “Indian” as a Political Classification

ICWA is the result of significant congressional inquiry over a
period of several years. The severity of the problem that Congress
documented cannot be understated: “in 1978, when ICWA was
passed, a large percentage of Indian children—one-quarter to onethird—were being adopted or placed in foster care families outside
of Tribal Nations.”282 In 1974, evidence was presented to Congress
revealing that “25 to 35% of all Indian children had been separated
from their families and placed in adoptive families, foster care, or
institutions.”283 As a result, “[t]he adoption rate of Indian children
was eight times that of non-Indian children,” and “[a]pproximately
90% of the Indian placements were in non-Indian homes.”284
To make matters worse, “state adoption policies provided little
to no protection for maintaining the tribal citizenship and political
affiliations of these adopted Indian children.”285 And as Congress
noted, in the wake of the loss of millions of acres of tribal lands in
the Allotment Acts, “the continued existence of a Tribal Nation’s
sovereign identity was, in large part, dependent on the nation’s
ability to maintain its future generations of citizens—citizens who

nontribal government agencies.” S. REP. NO. 95-597, at 11 (1977).
282. Brief of Amici Current and Former Members of Congress at 7, Adoptive
Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (No. 12-399) [hereinafter Adoptive Couple
Amicus Brief]. Mary Kathryn Nagle, one of this article’s authors, was an author of
the Adoptive Couple Amicus Brief.
283. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989) (citing
Indian Child Welfare Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the S.
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. 3, 15 (1974) [hereinafter 1974
Hearings]). In addition,
Congress’s examination of the crisis confirmed that Indian children
were far more likely to be removed from their families (and, as a result,
their Tribes) than other children. During the Senate hearings in 1974,
one witness described “[t]he wholesale removal of Indian children from
their homes” as “the most tragic aspect of Indian life today.”
Adoptive Couple Amicus Brief, supra note 282, at 8–9 (quoting 1974 Hearings, supra
(statement of William Byler)).
284. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 33 (citing 1974 Hearings, supra note 283, at 75–83).
285. Adoptive Couple Amicus Brief, supra note 282, at 6. “Both the Senate and the
House held hearings on this crisis with testimony ‘from the administration, Indian
people, State representatives, tribal leaders, medical and psychiatric professionals
and child welfare groups.’” Id. at 8 (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-597, at 12 (1977); H.R.
REP. NO. 95-1386, at 27–28 (1978)).

854

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:4

would learn the nation’s language, practice its traditions, and
participate in its tribal government, regardless of whether they lived
on or off a reservation.”286
As a result, Congress established the American Indian Policy
Review Commission, which established a task force that addressed
issues of Indian child welfare and culminated in a published report
in 1976.287 The next year, in 1977, the American Indian Policy
Review Commission submitted a report to Congress based in part on
the task force’s findings and recommendations.288
Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 as a remedy to these problems,
finding that “‘there is no resource that is more vital to the continued
existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children,’ . . . and
that Indian Tribes would likely cease to exist as sovereign, political
entities absent congressional intervention.”289 As Representative
Robert J. Lagomarsino explained, the bill was enacted to reverse
conditions that threatened the future of Tribal Nations.290 The
legislative record showed “considerable emphasis on the impact on
the tribes themselves of the massive removal of their children.”291
“Congress heard from several tribal leaders ‘that [their] children are
[their] greatest resource, and without them [tribes] have no
future.’”292 The task force recognized that “[c]hild rearing and the
maintenance of tribal identity are essential tribal relations.”293 “The
large number of Indian children placed with families outside their

286. Adoptive Couple Amicus Brief, supra note 282, at 6–7. In addition, “after ‘over
4 years of congressional hearings, oversight, and investigation’ conducted during
three sessions of Congress, Congress concluded that ‘Indian tribes and Indian
people are being drained of their children, and, as a result, their future as a tribe
and a people [have been] placed in jeopardy.’” Id. at 7 (quoting 124 CONG. REC.
38101-02 (1978) (statement of the principal sponsor of ICWA, Rep. Morris Udall));
see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 27 (1978).
287. Adoptive Couple Amicus Brief, supra note 282, at 8 (citing TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 109, at 2).
288. See generally 1 AM. INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 210.
289. Adoptive Couple Amicus Brief, supra note 282, at 7 (quoting the Indian Child
Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (2012)).
290. Id. (quoting 124 CONG. REC. 38,102 (1978)).
291. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 34 (1989).
292. Adoptive Couple Amicus Brief, supra note 282, at 9 (quoting Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 1214 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs and Public
Lands of the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong. 78 (1978)
[hereinafter 1978 Hearings] (statement of Faye La Pointe, Puyallup Tribe official)).
293. Id. (quoting TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 109, at 86).
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Tribal Nations ‘paralyz[ed] the ability of the tribe to perpetuate
itself.’”294
Accordingly, Congress’s goal in enacting ICWA was to preserve
“the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes.”295 Congress
intended for ICWA “to establish minimum federal standards and
procedural safeguards in State Indian child custody proceedings
designed to protect the rights of the child as an Indian, the Indian
family and the Indian tribe.”296 ICWA’s procedural safeguards reflect
Congress’s care in creating those standards:
[First], because Congress found that a Tribal Nation’s
sovereignty depends upon the preservation of extended
Indian family relationships within the tribe, Congress
crafted provisions designed to ensure that a court’s first
attempt to place an adopted Indian child is with a member
of his or her extended family.297 [Second], understanding
the complex history surrounding Indian lands, Congress
created provisions that not only recognize a tribe’s
inherent jurisdiction concerning the placement of an
Indian child domiciled on a reservation, but also afford
tribes jurisdictional and procedural rights in proceedings
involving children not domiciled on a reservation where
the parents’ rights have been voluntarily relinquished or
terminated by a State.298
Furthermore, by enacting ICWA, Congress sought to preserve
family relationships in order to preserve tribal sovereignty.299 During
its inquiry, Congress discovered that the family relationships that
serve as important aspects of tribal sovereignty and citizenship in
294. Id. (quoting TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 109, at 86); see also TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 109, at 78–79 (“One of the most pervasive components of the
various assimilation or termination phases of American policy has been the notion
that the way to destroy Indian tribal integrity and culture, usually justified as
‘civilizing Indians,’ is to remove Indian children from their homes and tribal
settings.”).
295. Adoptive Couple Amicus Brief, supra note 282, at 9 (quoting 25 U.S.C.
§ 1901(3) (1978)). As he read a letter from Rep. Robert J. Lagomarsino, Rep. Morris
Udall stated, “I firmly believe that the future and integrity of Indian tribes and
Indian families are in danger because of this crisis.” Id. at 13 (quoting 124 CONG.
REC. 38103 (1978)).
296. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 19 (1978).
297. Adoptive Couple Amicus Brief, supra note 282, at 14 (citing 25 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a) (2012)).
298. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1911).
299. Id. at 16.
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tribal communities extend beyond the parent-child relationship and
include the dozens of relatives “counted as close, responsible
members of the family.”300 The House Report concluded that the
“‘dynamics of Indian extended families are largely misunderstood’
by states and nontribal authorities that insist it is in the best interests
of Indian children to place them in non-Indian homes” outside of
their Tribal Nation based on cultural misunderstandings and
prejudice.301
With this understanding, Congress designed ICWA to
protect the parent-child relationship as an aspect of the
child’s relationship with the tribe. For instance, section
1912(f) sets a higher standard for the termination of
parental rights, and section 1913(a) requires that any
voluntary consent to termination of parental rights be
executed in writing and recorded before a judge of a “court
of competent jurisdiction,” who must certify that the terms
and consequences of the consent were fully explained and
understood. The parental termination provisions found in
these sections serve ICWA’s broader purpose that, “where
possible, an Indian child should remain in the Indian
community.”302
Congress further determined that when an Indian child’s
biological parents’ rights have been terminated—whether
voluntarily or involuntarily—the extended family “should be the first
place that the state looks in searching for a placement that is in the
best interest of the child.”303 “If ‘good cause’ exists to prevent this
placement, then State courts must look to place the child with ‘other
members of the Indian child’s tribe,’ and, if a suitable home within
the tribe is not available, then preference is given to placement in
‘other Indian families.’”304 Section 1915 is a result of congressional
evidence indicating that “tribal citizenship is best preserved within
the context of an extended Indian family.”305
ICWA also addressed the crisis’s jurisdictional concerns.
Congress recognized that “[t]he exclusive jurisdiction of the tribe
300. Id. at 16–17 (quoting 1974 Hearings, supra note 283, at 18).
301. Id. at 17 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 10).
302. Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a); Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 37 (1989)).
303. Id. at 17–18 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a), which states that “preference shall
be given . . . to a placement with (1) a member of the child’s extended family”).
304. Id. at 18 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a)).
305. Id.
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[over the adoption placements of its children] is well founded in the
law.”306 “ICWA thus contains not only ‘procedural and substantive
standards for those child custody proceedings that do take place in
state court,’307 but also procedural rights meant to protect the Indian
tribe’s inherent sovereign jurisdiction over the placement and legal
status of its own citizens.”308
First, “[i]n enacting the ICWA Congress confirmed that, in child
custody proceedings involving Indian children domiciled on the
reservation, tribal jurisdiction was exclusive as to the States.”309 “This
provision acknowledges the status of Tribal Nations as sovereign
entities” with exclusive jurisdiction over the domestic affairs of tribal
citizens residing on tribal lands.310
Second, because of the American Indian Policy Review
Commission task force’s finding that the “concept of [tribal] court
jurisdiction is based on the tribal status of the individual rather than
the mere geography of the child,”311 Congress decided that ICWA
must afford tribes certain procedural rights regarding the placement
of their citizens who reside off-reservation.312 Thus, when the Indian
child is not domiciled on tribal lands, “section 1911(b) creates the
presumption that any proceeding concerning foster care or the
termination of parental rights for an Indian child will be transferred
to Tribal Court, ‘absent objection by either parent . . . or the Indian
custodian or the Indian child’s tribe.’”313 ICWA thus reflects
Congress’s determination that an Indian Nation has a sovereign
interest in its citizens no matter where they reside.
Ultimately, ICWA’s entire application hinges on whether the
child is an “Indian child” under the statute. If the child is not an
“Indian child,” then none of ICWA’s provisions apply. Congress’s
definition of “Indian child,” therefore, is significant as it stems from
Congress’s consideration of testimony from tribal leaders.314 These
tribal leaders confirmed that “without a future generation of citizens,
306. Id. at 19 (citing S. REP. NO. 95-597, at 17 (1977); Fisher v. District Court,
424 U.S. 382 (1976)).
307. Id. (quoting Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 36).
308. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 95-597, at 17 (1977); Fisher, 424 U.S. 382)).
309. Id. at 20 (quoting Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 42).
310. Id.
311. Id. (TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 109, at 86).
312. Id.
313. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (2012)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 21
(1978) (“Either parent is given the right to veto such transfer.”).
314. Adoptive Couple Amicus Brief, supra note 282 at 15.
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tribal governments would have no means by which to transfer their
culture, heritage, language, or civic duties such as voting and
participation in self-governance.”315 Indeed, “without citizens, tribes
have no future leaders; without future leaders, tribes have no selfgovernment” and simply cease to exist.316 For this reason, the
applicability of ICWA is contingent upon citizenship in a Tribal
Nation—not a minimum amount of blood quantum and certainly
not race.
ICWA defines an “Indian child” as “any unmarried person who
is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe
or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the
biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.”317 Congress made
ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” contingent upon tribal
citizenship because it understood that “the preservation of tribal selfgovernment derives from the preservations of a tribe’s future
citizens.”318
Accordingly, for ICWA to apply, the child must already be an
enrolled citizen or the child’s parent must be an enrolled citizen and
the child must be eligible for citizenship under her tribe’s
citizenship requirements.319 “This limited definition confirms the
congressional purpose behind ICWA: in instances where a child is
already a citizen, or is eligible for citizenship, and her parent has
elected to maintain his citizenship, then the child’s tribe has a
sovereign, political interest in where that child is placed.”320
Congress remained cognizant that “for an adult Indian, there is
an absolute right of expatriation from one’s tribe.”321 Thus, Congress
realized that “a child’s parent could terminate voluntary tribal
membership at any time. For this reason, Congress intentionally
refrained from extending ICWA’s application to children who are
eligible for citizenship in a tribe, but whose parents have elected to

315. Id.
316. Id. (citing 1978 Hearings, supra note 292, at 193) (citing testimony that
adoption practices that place Tribes’ future citizens outside of tribal communities
“seriously undercut the tribes’ ability to continue as self-governing communities”).
317. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).
318. Adoptive Couple Amicus Brief, supra note 282, at 14 (citing § 1903(4)).
319. Id. at 14–15 (citing § 1903(4)).
320. Id. at 15.
321. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 20 (1978)); see U.S. ex rel. Standing
Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695 (1879).
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terminate their citizenship with the tribe or simply never
enrolled.”322
ICWA also excludes children who are not eligible for
citizenship, even though one or both of their parents may be.323 By
excluding these children, Congress refrained from imposing its own
arbitrary definition of citizenship on a Tribal Nation, thereby
respecting the United States Supreme Court’s decision that “[a]
tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has
long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent
political community.”324 Congress’s definition of “Indian child” in
ICWA, therefore, “recognized that Congress’s authority over Indian
affairs extends only to individuals who meet the individual tribe’s
unique, political qualifications for citizenship.”325
In stark contrast to the policies of the Dawes Commission and
the Secretary’s implementation of the Burke Act of 1906, ICWA’s
applicability hinges on political affiliation with a Sovereign Nation—
not on a minimum amount of blood quantum.
V. THE SUPREME COURT AFFIRMED THE INHERENT RIGHT OF
TRIBAL NATIONS TO DEFINE THEIR CITIZENSHIP AND THE USE OF
“INDIAN” IN FEDERAL INDIAN LAW AS A POLITICAL CLASSIFICATION
Contemporaneous with the passage of ICWA, and following
four decades of congressional effort to restore the tribal selfdetermination and sovereignty that the Allotment Acts sought to
eliminate, the Supreme Court took up two cases to answer questions
that would, ultimately, determine the constitutionality of legislation
Congress passes relying on “Indian” as a political classification to
signify citizenship in a Tribal Nation. In Morton v. Mancari in 1974,
the Supreme Court concluded that the policy of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) to give preference to hiring Indians over nonIndians did not constitute invidious racial discrimination in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause.326 And in 1978, the same year that
ICWA was enacted, the Supreme Court decided Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, wherein the Court upheld the inherent right of the Santa

322. Adoptive Couple Amicus Brief, supra note 282, at 15; see § 1903(4)(b).
323. Adoptive Couple Amicus Brief, supra note 282, at 16; see § 1903(4)(b).
324. Adoptive Couple Amicus Brief, supra note 282, at 16 (quoting Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n.32 (1978)).
325. Id.
326. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553–54 (1974).
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Clara Pueblo to define who could—and who could not—be a citizen
of its Nation.327 Thus, forty years after the passage of the IRA,
Congress’s efforts to restore tribal self-determination and selfgovernance through acts of legislation using “Indian” as a criterion
were declared fully, and unquestionably, constitutional.
A.

Morton v. Mancari

In Morton, a group of non-Indian employees of the BIA brought
a class-action lawsuit challenging the employment preference the
IRA created to ensure tribal citizens were hired by the BIA.328 The
Court in Morton explained,
The Secretary of the Interior is directed to establish
standards of health, age, character, experience,
knowledge, and ability for Indians who may be appointed,
without regard to civil-service laws, to the various positions
maintained, now or hereafter, by the Indian Office, in the
administration of functions or services affecting any Indian
tribe. Such qualified Indians shall hereafter have the
preference to appointment to vacancies in any such
positions.329
Thus, as discussed above, the IRA defines “Indian” as any
member of a Tribal Nation. Several non-Indian BIA employees
challenged the preference the IRA created for “Indians” in the BIA,
claiming the preference violated the anti-discrimination provisions
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (EEOA)330 and
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. A three-judge
panel of the district court considered the challenges and determined
that in passing the EEOA in 1972, Congress had impliedly repealed
the “Indian” preference it put in place in 1934 in the IRA.331 Because
the district court determined the 1972 EEOA impliedly repealed the
preference in the IRA, the district court did not need to address the
constitutional inquiry.332
327. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72 n.32.
328. Morton, 417 U.S. at 537.
329. Id. at 537–38 (emphasis added) (quoting the Indian Reorganization Act of
June 18, 1934, ch. 576, § 12, 48 Stat. 984, 986 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 5129 (2012))).
330. Equal Opportunity Employment Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17).
331. Morton, 417 U.S. at 536.
332. Id. at 540.
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The Supreme Court reversed and upheld the hiring preference
for Indian employees in the BIA.333 The Court made clear that it
could not consider whether the prohibitions against racial
discrimination in the 1972 EEOA impliedly repealed the hiring
preference in the IRA without placing the statutory question in its
proper historical context.334 First, the Court noted that “[t]he
preference directly at issue here was enacted as an important part of
the sweeping Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.”335 As such, the
Court looked at the statutory purpose of the IRA and determined
that the “Act was to establish machinery whereby Indian tribes would
be able to assume a greater degree of self-government, both
politically and economically.”336 The Court explained,
It is in this historical and legal context that the
constitutional validity of the Indian preference is to be
determined. As discussed above, Congress in 1934
determined that proper fulfillment of its trust required
turning over to the Indians a greater control of their own
destinies. The overly paternalistic approach of prior years
had proved both exploitative and destructive of Indian
interests. Congress was united in the belief that
institutional changes were required. An important part of
the Indian Reorganization Act was the preference
provision here at issue.337
The Court noted that the “Indian” preference in the IRA was
one of many preferences Congress had passed since 1934 and
further that
[t]he purpose of these preferences, as variously expressed
in the legislative history, has been to give Indians a greater
participation in their own self-government; to further the
Government’s trust obligation toward the Indian tribes;
and to reduce the negative effect of having non-Indians
administer matters that affect Indian tribal life.338
The Court likewise reasoned that “Congress was well aware that
the proposed preference would result in employment disadvantages
within the BIA for non-Indians.”339 This disadvantage, however, did
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

Id. at 553–55.
Id. at 553.
Id. at 542.
Id.
Id. at 553.
Id. at 541–42.
Id. at 544.
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not support the conclusion that Congress intended for the EEOA to
impliedly repeal the IRA’s Indian preference because Congress had
“explicitly determined that [the] gradual replacement of nonIndians with Indians within the Bureau was a desirable feature of the
entire program for self-government.”340 It was within this historical
and legal context that the Supreme Court considered whether the
Indian preference was repealed by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 and concluded it was not.341
The Court next determined whether the hiring preference
constituted invidious racial discrimination in violation of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.342 Of course, one hundred years
before, the authors of the Equal Protection Clause determined that
the Civil War Amendments would have no application to Indians on
account of their status as citizens of separate sovereigns—Indian
Nations—with whom the United States had signed numerous
treaties requiring the United States Congress to legislate with
regards to Tribal Nations and their citizens.343 Accordingly, the
Court commenced its constitutional analysis by noting that

340. Id.
341. Id. at 545. The Court’s conclusion that Congress did not intend for the
EEOA’s prohibitions against racial discrimination to repeal the IRA’s “Indian”
preference was further supported by the fact that “[t]hree months after Congress
passed the 1972 amendments, it enacted two new Indian preference laws.” Id. at
548. As the Court noted,
These [new Indian preference laws] were part of the Education
Amendments of 1972. The new laws explicitly require that Indians be
given preference in Government programs for training teachers of
Indian children. It is improbable, to say the least, that the same Congress
which affirmatively approved and enacted these additional and similar
Indian preferences was, at the same time, condemning the BIA
preference as racially discriminatory. In the total absence of any
manifestation of supportive intent, we are loathe to imply this
improbable result.
Id. at 548–49 (internal citations omitted).
342. Id. at 551.
343. See S. REP. NO. 41-268, at 1, 9 (1870) (“[T]he fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution has no effect whatever upon the status of the Indian tribes . . . and does
not annul the treaties previously made between them and the United States. . . .
[T]he Indians, in tribal condition, have never been subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States in the sense in which the term jurisdiction is employed in the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution.” (emphasis added)).

2017]

CLOSE TO ZERO

863

“[r]esolution of the instant issue turns on the unique legal status of
Indian tribes under federal law.”344
The Supreme Court further noted that as a result of the treaties
the United States signed, the United States remained legally
obligated to provide rations and annuities and perform other duties
for citizens of Tribal Nations—an obligation the United States would
not be able to fulfill if it could not classify or identify tribal citizens
as “Indians” in federal legislation.345 The Court explained,
Literally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian
tribes and reservations, and certainly all legislation dealing
with the BIA, single out for special treatment a constituency
of tribal Indians living on or near reservations. If these laws,
derived from historical relationships and explicitly
designed to help only Indians, were deemed invidious
racial discrimination, an entire Title of the United States
Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively erased and the
solemn commitment of the Government toward the
Indians would be jeopardized.346
The Court, therefore, determined that the hiring preference
did not constitute racial discrimination.347 The Court further
explained that the preference was not “even a ‘racial’ preference”
because “[t]he preference, as applied, is granted to Indians not as a
discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign
tribal entities whose lives and activities are governed by the BIA in a
unique fashion.”348 Therefore, in Morton v. Mancari, the Supreme
Court confirmed that classifying tribal citizens as “Indians”
constitutes a political—and not a racial—classification that does not
trigger the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibitions on racial
discrimination.
B.

Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez

Four years after the Court determined that the use of “Indians”
in federal legislation constitutes a political and not a racial
classification, the Supreme Court upheld the inherent sovereign
right of Tribal Nations to define who are—and who are not—citizens
of their Nations. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the Supreme Court
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

Morton, 417 U.S. at 551.
Id. at 552.
Id.
Id. at 553.
Id. at 553–54.
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considered “whether a federal court may pass on the validity of an
Indian tribe’s ordinance denying membership to the children of
certain female tribal members.”349
A female citizen of the Santa Clara Pueblo and her daughter
sued the Santa Clara Pueblo because a tribal law denied the daughter
citizenship on the basis that her father was not a citizen.350 The
mother, Julia Martinez, was a member of the Santa Clara Pueblo, and
she resided on the Santa Clara Reservation in Northern New
Mexico.351 She married a citizen of the Navajo Nation and, together
they had several children, including Audrey Martinez.352 Two years
before Julia’s marriage, the Santa Clara Pueblo passed a law barring
admission of the Martinez children to the Tribe because their father
was not a citizen of Santa Clara Pueblo. In response, the daughter
and mother filed suit, claiming that the rule “discriminates on the
basis of both sex and ancestry in violation of Title I of the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303.”353
The Supreme Court, however, declared that federal courts have
no authority to tell a Tribal Nation how it must define its
citizenship.354 The Court’s decision was based on respect for the
inherent sovereignty of Indian Tribes as separate, Sovereign Nations:
“Indian tribes are ‘distinct, independent political communities,
retaining their original natural rights’ in matters of local selfgovernment.”355 Thus, Tribal Nations have the inherent right to
define their own citizenship even if, under the United States
Constitution, the citizenship laws could be found violative of the
Equal Protection Clause because “[a]s separate sovereigns preexisting the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as
unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically
as limitations on federal or state authority.”356
In line with prior Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, the
Santa Clara Pueblo Court cited its prior decision in Elk v. Wilkins,
wherein the Supreme Court concluded that the Civil War
Amendments have no application to Indian Nations and their
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

436 U.S. 49, 51 (1978).
Id. at 51–52.
Id. at 52.
Id.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 55 (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832)).
Id. at 56.
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citizens because, as the Court reasoned, “the tribes remain quasisovereign nations which, by government structure, culture, and
source of sovereignty are in many ways foreign to the constitutional
institutions of the federal and state governments.”357
Together, Morton and Santa Clara Pueblo affirm the original, preand post-Allotment Era understanding of “Indians” as a political, and
not a racial, classification. While Morton confirmed that the federal
government’s classification of “Indian” refers strictly to a citizen of a
Tribal Nation, Santa Clara Pueblo upheld the inherent right of Tribal
Nations to define who that citizen could be—regardless of American
notions of race or sex discrimination originating in the Civil War
Amendments. Whereas 1887 to 1934 demarcated an era wherein the
federal government imposed minimum blood quantum
requirements to strip Tribal Nations of their lands and their citizens,
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence interpreting the IRA confirmed
the Act’s success in restoring “Indian” as a political classification and
ensuring that Tribal Nations—not the federal government—have
the authority to say who is a tribal citizen and who is not.
VI. THE RETURN OF A MINIMUM BLOOD QUANTUM REQUIREMENT IN
CURRENT ICWA CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
“[H]ad Baby Girl not been 3/256 Cherokee, Biological
Father would have had no right to object to her adoption
under South Carolina law.”
—Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl (2013) 358
In 2013, nearly eighty years after Congress decidedly departed
from the Allotment Acts’ imposition of a minimum blood quantum
requirement to define tribal citizenship, the United States Supreme
Court revitalized the concept of a minimum blood quantum,
deeming it relevant to the adjudication of the placement of an
Indian child under ICWA.359 In Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, the
Supreme Court considered whether the parental rights of a
biological father of an Indian child had been terminated under
§ 1912(d) such that the father could no longer challenge his
daughter’s placement with outside adoptive parents.360
357.
358.
359.
360.

Id. at 71 (citing Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884)).
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2559 (2013).
See id. at 2552.
Id.
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Although the question involved a purely legal issue of statutory
interpretation regarding the termination of parental rights under 25
U.S.C. § 1912(d), Justice Alito began his opinion for the majority by
announcing the Indian child’s blood quantum, stating, “This case is
about a little girl (Baby Girl) who is classified as an Indian because
she is 1.2% (3/256) Cherokee.”361 Of course, under the law, the
child’s blood quantum is entirely irrelevant to the question of
whether parental rights have been lawfully terminated to allow for
her adoption under § 1912(d).362
However, instead of simply focusing on whether the father’s
parental rights had been lawfully terminated under § 1912(d), the
Supreme Court based its decision, in part, on the fact that “had Baby
Girl not been 3/256 Cherokee, Biological Father would have had no
right to object to her adoption under South Carolina law.”363 For the
first time since Congress ended the Termination Era altogether, a
lack of sufficient blood quantum was used as a factor in determining
whether an individual could be considered “Indian” under federal
law. Only this time it was the Court—and not Congress—threatening
to substitute a Tribal Nation’s inherent right to define its own
citizenship with an unspecified amount of judicially defined
minimum amount of blood quantum.
A review of the Supreme Court’s rhetoric at oral argument and
its final decision in Adoptive Couple reveals that the Court’s problem
was not that Baby Girl was “Indian,” but rather, the Court opined
that she was not Indian enough.364 In this regard, the Court’s use of
blood quantum to undermine Baby Girl’s Cherokee Nation
citizenship eligibility and the transfer of a child to non-Indian
parents is no different than the imposition of a minimum amount of
blood quantum to define tribal citizenship in the implementation of
the Burke Act.365 In both instances, the sufficiency of a tribal citizen’s
blood quantum is questioned in order to transfer Indian lands—or
Indian children—from the Tribal Nation to non-Indian
ownership.366
361. Id. at 2556.
362. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2012).
363. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2559.
364. Bethany R. Berger, In the Name of the Child: Race, Gender, and Economics in
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 67 FLA. L. REV. 295, 328 (2015); see Adoptive Couple,
133 S. Ct. at 2556; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 38–43.
365. Berger, supra note 364, at 328.
366. Id. at 330–31.
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The blood quantum arguments and questions advanced by the
Supreme Court at oral argument and in the final Adoptive Couple
opinion are not new. They are entirely unoriginal, as they trace their
origins to the federal allotment policies designed to eliminate tribal
lands and citizens and ultimately alter the United States’ treaty
obligations to Tribal Nations. Indeed, the comments made by the
Justices during oral argument closely mirror the sentiments
expressed by the Congress that enacted the Dawes Act and
subsequent Allotment Era statutes,367 as well as those members of
Congress who opposed the restoration of sovereignty over tribal
citizenship in the IRA.368
At oral argument, the Justices asked numerous questions
designed to highlight, question, or target the Indian child’s blood
quantum as a basis for disqualifying her from eligibility for Cherokee
Nation citizenship.369 For instance, Chief Justice Roberts inquired,
If—if you had a tribe, is there at all a threshold before you
can call, under the statute, a child an “Indian child”?
3/256ths? And what if the tribe—what if you had a tribe
with a zero percent blood requirement; they’re open for,
you know, people who want to apply, who think culturally
they’re a Cherokee or—or any number of fundamentally
accepted conversions.370
And just a few moments later, the Chief Justice returned to the
question of blood quantum, stating, “I’m just wondering is 3/256ths
close—close to zero?”371 Justice Breyer went further, questioning
Baby Girl’s eligibility for citizenship in the Cherokee Nation because
“it appears in this case [the Biological Father] had three Cherokee
ancestors at the time of George Washington’s father.”372
Of course, none of these Justices would question the inherent
sovereignty of the United States to grant American citizenship to the
367. See 42 CONG. REC. 449, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. (1908). For example, in arguing
for the removal of restrictions on Indian lands in Oklahoma, Representative Carter
stated, “As a matter of fact, they are not real Indians as you understand that term. A
great majority of them are mixed-blood Indians, with a small degree of Indian
blood. . . . [T]he actual Indian, the real full-blood Indian, only represents a very
small minority of people.” Id.
368. See Senate Committee Hearing on Self-Government, supra note 2, at 263–64;
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 38–43.
369. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 38–43.
370. Id. at 38–39.
371. Id. at 42–43.
372. Id. at 40.
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child of an American citizen, even if that child’s lineage was
occupied by a majority of non-American ancestors making her
percentage of American ancestors “close to zero.” The idea that a
citizen of the Cherokee Nation cannot give birth to or create a new
generation of Cherokee Nation citizens without a certain degree of
blood quantum is not derived from the Cherokee Nation’s law or
values—instead, such an idea traces its origins to a time in American
history when lawmakers sought, unsuccessfully, to eradicate the
citizens of Tribal Nations altogether.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court refused to apply a plain reading
of ICWA’s text and evaluate whether the parental rights of Baby
Girl’s father had been lawfully terminated because, as the majority
determined, to do so “would put certain vulnerable children at a
great disadvantage solely because an ancestor—even a remote one—was
an Indian,” an interpretation that “would raise equal protection
concerns.”373 That is, relying on the determination that Baby Girl’s
blood quantum did not meet some undefined minimum threshold,
the Court replaced her father’s citizenship in the Cherokee Nation
with the concept that ICWA was triggered based on her ancestry
alone. In this regard, ancestry became another way for the Court to
promote the concept that, below a certain minimum threshold
blood quantum, one can no longer be a tribal citizen or, ultimately,
an “Indian” under federal law.
The ultimate irony of the Supreme Court’s introduction of a
minimum amount of blood quantum as a relevant factor in its ICWA
analysis is that the Court’s injection of race into a political
classification has inspired a series of lawsuits that challenge ICWA’s
“Indian child” definition as an impermissible racial classification
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 374
Such a conclusion, of course, contradicts the Supreme Court’s prior
decision in Elk v. Wilkins, in which the Court concluded that the
authors of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to exclude
“Indians” based on their political classification, meaning that

373. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013) (emphasis
added).
374. Other constitutional challenges to ICWA have been asserted, such as the
use of the Commerce Clause as a basis for legislating Indian child welfare; however,
the same historical facts that invalidate any equal protection argument apply to
these other constitutional challenges as well. Such other challenges are discussed in
numerous other articles and are not directly pertinent to this article’s thesis.
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“Indians” refers to members of “distinct political communities” or
separate Sovereign Nations.375
The Supreme Court’s “near zero” blood quantum/ancestry
dicta in Adoptive Couple likewise contradicts the Court’s conclusion in
Morton v. Mancari, in which the Court held that following Congress’s
departure from the Allotment Acts’ reliance on a threshold amount
of blood quantum to define citizenship, post-1934, “Indian” under
federal law signifies citizenship in a Tribal Nation and is therefore a
political, and not a racial, classification.376 And the Supreme Court’s
suggestion that it could impose a minimum blood quantum
requirement to define Cherokee Nation citizenship directly
contradicts the Court’s affirmance in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez
of the inherent right of Tribal Nations to define their own
citizenship.
And yet, despite this jurisprudential dissonance, because of
Adoptive Couple’s blood quantum/ancestry dicta, agencies that work
to place Indian children in non-Indian homes are leading the way in
bringing race-based constitutional challenges to ICWA’s “Indian
child” classification.
On May 27, 2015, National Council for Adoption filed a lawsuit
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, challenging ICWA as unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause.377 Shortly thereafter, on July 6, 2015, the ScharfNorton Center for Constitutional Litigation at the Goldwater
Institute followed suit, filing claims in the United States District
Court for the District of Arizona, alleging that ICWA’s “Indian child”
classification is racial and therefore unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause.378 Both actions challenge the
constitutionality of ICWA and, in doing so, specifically attack the
Cherokee Nation’s Constitution and citizenship requirements—in
addition to the constitutions and laws of several other Tribal Nations.
Like the majority in Adoptive Couple, these two lawsuits challenge
the inherent right of Tribal Nations to establish citizenship
requirements void of a minimum amount of blood quantum.
Ultimately, they invite the federal government to, once again,
375. 112 U.S. 94, 111 (1884).
376. Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian
Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court’s Changing Vision, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 80 n.335
(1993).
377. Nat’l Council Complaint, supra note 28, at ¶¶ 5, 6, 7, 53, 65, 106–128.
378. Goldwater Litigation Complaint, supra note 3.
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attempt to eradicate its federal trust responsibility to citizens of
Tribal Nations.
A.

National Council for Adoption v. Jewell

On May 27, 2015, National Council for Adoption filed a lawsuit
in the Eastern District of Virginia, naming then-Secretary of the
Interior Sally Jewell and then-Assistant Secretary Kevin Washburn as
defendants.379 National Council’s lawsuit challenges the
constitutionality of the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ 2015 “Guidelines
for State Courts and Agencies in Indian Child Custody Proceedings,”
as well as the constitutionality of ICWA as applied to “Indian
children,” on the basis that the 1978 statute constitutes an
impermissible race-based classification that violates Equal
Protection.380
While Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Breyer, and Justice Alito
questioned whether a minimum amount of blood quantum must be
required before someone would be permitted to enroll as a tribal
citizen under federal law, National Council’s complaint attempts to
revise the “Indian child” definition in ICWA by conflating Indian
ancestry with tribal membership.381 Of course, membership in a
Tribe is determinative of a child’s status as an “Indian child” under
ICWA, not ancestry. For instance, National Council posits that “most
children are classified as ‘Indian children’ under the 2015
Guidelines’ interpretation of ICWA based solely on their ancestry.”382
National Council’s assertion that “most children are classified as
‘Indian children’ . . . based solely on their ancestry” is directly
contradicted by the plain language of the statute itself. Congress
made ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” contingent upon tribal
citizenship.383 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) defines “Indian child” as “any
unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a
member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an
Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian
tribe.”

379.
2015).
380.
381.
382.
383.

Nat’l Council for Adoption v. Jewell, 156 F. Supp. 3d 727, 730 (E.D. Va.
Id.
Nat’l Council Complaint, supra note 28, at ¶¶ 106–109.
Id. (emphasis added).
25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2012).

2017]

CLOSE TO ZERO

871

Thus, for ICWA to apply, either the child must already be an
enrolled citizen at the time of the state proceedings or the child’s
parent must be an enrolled citizen and the child herself must be
eligible for citizenship under her Tribe’s unique citizenship
requirements.384 This limited definition confirms the congressional
purpose behind ICWA: in instances where a child is already a citizen,
or is eligible for citizenship and her parent has elected to maintain
his citizenship, then the child’s Tribal Nation has a sovereign,
political interest in where that child is placed.385
“Indian child” under ICWA, therefore, turns on whether the
child’s parent has maintained a political relationship with a
Sovereign Tribal Nation such that the child, or the parent, is
enrolled. A child is not—as National Council posits—an “Indian
child” because she has an ancestor who was once a tribal citizen.
Indeed, there are thousands—if not millions—of American children
who have Indian ancestors but do not constitute “Indian children”
under ICWA because neither they nor their parents are enrolled
citizens of a Tribal Nation.
Whether or not one’s ancestors are “Indians” has no bearing on
ICWA’s application, and yet National Council has made ancestry its
focal point for the equal protection challenge it brings, asserting that
ICWA “impermissibly discriminates against birth parents of ‘Indian
children’ by limiting adoptive placements based on the ‘Indian’
ancestry of those children in violation of the equal protection rights
secured by the Fifth Amendment.”386 That is, with complete
disregard for the fact that a child’s designation as “Indian child”
under ICWA is contingent upon the parent’s decision to enroll
either himself or his child—and not the mere existence of some
tribal citizen ancestor in the past—National Council’s complaint
avers that “ICWA violates the due process and equal protection rights
of ‘Indian children’” because the Act “discriminates against those
children on the basis of their ‘Indian’ ancestry.”387
To be fair, National Council finds support for its
mischaracterization of ICWA’s “Indian child” definition in the
comments made by several Justices during the Adoptive Couple oral
argument. For instance, Justice Breyer commented that Baby Girl’s
citizenship eligibility in the Cherokee Nation was contingent upon
384.
385.
386.
387.

See id.
See id. § 1901 (stating the congressional findings and the purpose of ICWA).
Nat’l Council Complaint, supra note 28, at ¶ 6.
Id.
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the fact that her father “had three Cherokee ancestors at the time of
George Washington’s father,”388 which implies that ICWA’s “Indian
child” definition is based on ancestry. It is not. Baby Girl is not an
“Indian child” because she has ancestors who were Cherokee at the
time of George Washington. She is an “Indian child” because her
father is a citizen of the Cherokee Nation, and she is his biological
child, and under the Cherokee Nation’s laws, she is eligible for
citizenship (if not yet already enrolled).389
Justice Breyer’s substitution of ancestry for political citizenship
would erroneously bring many non-Indian Americans, such as
Senator Elizabeth Warren, into ICWA’s reach. Senator Warren’s
children could never be “Indian children” under ICWA, however,
because they are not enrolled in the Cherokee Nation and neither is
their parent, Senator Warren.
Indian ancestry has no bearing on ICWA’s application, and yet,
it has become the foundation for the recent constitutional
challenges brought against the Act.
B.

A.D. v. Washburn—The Claim

Less than two months after National Council filed its lawsuit, the
Goldwater Institute followed suit, also challenging ICWA as relying
upon a race-based classification in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.390 The Goldwater Institute
openly acknowledges that its “case is a successor to Adoptive Couple v.
Baby Girl, . . . challeng[ing] the constitutionality of provisions of the
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. § 1901, et
seq.”391
In its Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the
Goldwater Institute states,
In Baby Girl, the United States and others pressed an
interpretation of ICWA that the Court concluded ‘would
put certain vulnerable children at a great disadvantage
solely because an ancestor—even a remote one—was an
Indian,’ an interpretation that ‘would raise equal
protection concerns.’ Here, plaintiffs challenge ICWA

388.
389.
390.
391.

Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 40.
Berger, supra note 364, at 327.
See generally Goldwater Litigation Complaint, supra note 3.
Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 70, at 1.

2017]

CLOSE TO ZERO

873

provisions on their face and as applied by defendants that
do exactly that.392
Just as the majority in Adoptive Couple attempted to re-write
ICWA and render the “Indian child” classification contingent upon
the identification of an Indian ancestor, the Goldwater Institute’s
action attempts to insert the words “Indian ancestor” or “ancestry”
into ICWA’s “Indian child” definition. A plain reading of the
statute—as well as an understanding of the evolution of “Indian”
under federal law—reveals that the Goldwater Institute’s insertion of
“Indian ancestor” is nothing more than an attempt to create a racial
classification where none exists.
To be clear, ICWA’s “Indian child” definition renders the
identity of an “Indian child” contingent upon the political
citizenship of one of the child’s biological parents—not ancestor—
or the biological parent’s decision to enroll his or her child, if the
child is already a tribal citizen at the time of the adoption
proceedings.393 ICWA’s “Indian child” definition, therefore, is not
connected or at all related to the identification of some ancient,
phantom Indian ancestor that the Goldwater Institute hypothesizes.
As discussed above, many Americans may be able to trace their
bloodline to “Indian ancestors;” however, if their parents did not
elect to enroll in a Tribal Nation or if they do not meet the unique
citizenship requirements of their Nation, they will never qualify as
an “Indian child” under the Act. Qualifying as an “Indian child,”
accordingly, is a not question of ancestry. Instead, it is a classification
that reflects the political affiliations of the child’s biological
parent394—just as citizenship in the United States is contingent upon
the choice of a biological parent to maintain, affirm, or expatriate
oneself from United States citizenship.
A review of the Goldwater Institute’s complaint and preliminary
motion papers reveals that the Institute’s constitutional challenge is
predicated almost entirely on the insertion of the words “Indian
ancestry” or “Indian ancestor” into ICWA’s definition of “Indian
child.” Many of the Institute’s constitutional challenges hinge on
ancestry, with the following being examples:
• “ICWA[] . . . violate[s] the substantive due process rights of
children with Indian ancestry, and those of adults involved
392. Id. at 1 (citation omitted) (quoting Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct.
2552, 2565 (2013)).
393. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4)(b) (2012).
394. Berger, supra note 364, at 327.
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in their care and upbringing who have an existing familylike relationship with the child.”395
• “[The implementation of ICWA’s provisions] ha[ve] caused
significant emotional and psychological harm to baby boy
C. who, through no fault of his own, has to leave the security
of his home and visit with strangers solely because he was
born with Indian ancestry.”396
Thus, the Goldwater Institute’s first step in creating a racial
classification is to replace ICWA’s tribal citizenship requirement in
§ 1903(4) with Indian ancestry—despite the fact that the word
“ancestry” appears nowhere in the statute. The Goldwater Institute
next equates Indian ancestry with race, asserting that “children with
Indian ancestry are singled out and afforded separate, unequal
treatment resulting in delayed resolution of foster care placement
and termination of parental rights proceedings of children with
Indian ancestry, based solely on their race.”397 Additional examples
of how the Goldwater Institute equates “ancestry” with “race” include
the following:
• “This separate, unequal treatment of children with Indian
ancestry is based solely on the child’s race.”398
• “[The provisions of ICWA] deprive children with Indian
ancestry of an individualized race-neutral determination
that all other children enjoy under state law.”399
• “[U]nder ICWA, these families are subjected to procedural
and substantive provisions that are based solely on the race
of the children and the adults involved, which lead to severe
disruption in their lives contrary to the children’s best
interests.”400
• “All of the Indian children and all of the parents who are
seeking to care for and adopt them are affected by ICWA on
the basis of the race of these children.”401
Just as National Council picked up on the Adoptive Couple
Court’s imposition of an undefined minimum amount of blood
395. Goldwater Litigation Complaint, supra note 3, ¶ 99.
396. Id. at 6–7 (emphasis added).
397. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
398. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
399. Id. at 20–21 (emphasis added).
400. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
401. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at 9, A.D. v. Washburn, No. 2:15CV-01259-PHX-NVW (D. Ariz. filed Aug. 21, 2015), 2017 WL 1019685 [hereinafter
Goldwater Class Certification Motion].
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quantum necessary for tribal citizenship under ICWA, the Goldwater
Institute followed suit and cited the absence of an unspecified
threshold amount of blood quantum in the citizenship requirements
of Tribal Nations as yet another basis to conclude that ICWA’s
“Indian child” definition constitutes an impermissible race-based
classification. Like National Council, the Goldwater Institute
repeatedly decries the failure of several Tribal Nations to impose a
minimum amount of blood quantum before recognizing an
individual as a citizen in statements such as the following examples:
• “Some of the tribes consider individuals with only a tiny
percentage of Indian blood to be Indian, even if they have
little or no contact or connection with the tribe. See, e.g.,
Cherokee Nation Const. art. IV, § 1.”402
• “Thus, in many instances, children with only a minute
quantum of Indian blood and no connection or ties to the
tribe are subject to ICWA and relegated to the tribe’s
exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction.”403
ICWA only inquires as to whether a child is a citizen of a Tribal
Nation or the biological child of a citizen and also eligible for
citizenship. However, in its complaint, the Goldwater Institute
repeatedly points out the lack of a blood quantum requirement for
the children on whose behalf the Institute purports to sue. For
instance, the Goldwater Institute identifies Baby Girl A.D. as having
“more than 50% non-Indian blood.”404 And the Institute identifies
Baby Boy C. as having “more than 50% Hispanic blood.”405 The
Goldwater Institute then concludes that “[b]y virtue of ICWA, the
tribes make the primary determination whether children with a
specified blood quantum will be brought within their jurisdiction
and control.”406 This, of course, is not true based on a reading of the
plain language of the statute in § 1903(4). Under § 1903(4), a parent
can disenroll him or herself (and the child, if the parent previously
enrolled the child), and then the child would no longer qualify as
an “Indian child” under ICWA, regardless of blood quantum or the
existence of an Indian ancestor. ICWA places the “primary
determination,” as the Institute labels it, in the hands of the child’s
biological parents.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.

Goldwater Litigation Complaint, supra note 3, ¶ 41.
Id. ¶ 42.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id. ¶ 115.
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Yet, by inserting blood quantum and an Indian ancestor into
§ 1903(4), the Goldwater Institute claims that ICWA’s application is
contingent upon a racial classification that violates the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. In direct contradiction to
the authors’ conviction that the Civil War Amendments would in no
way prohibit the federal government from classifying individuals as
“Indians” based on their citizenship in a Tribal Nation, the
Goldwater Institute repeatedly cites equal protection as the basis for
the Institute’s constitutional challenge, such as in the following
allegations:
• “There can be no law under our Constitution that creates
and applies pervasive separate and unequal treatment to
individuals based on a quantum of blood tracing to a
particular race or ethnicity. This country committed itself to
that principle when it ratified the Fourteenth Amendment
and overturned Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857),
and when it abandoned Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896).”407
• “Children with Indian ancestry, however, are still living in
the era of Plessy v. Ferguson. Alone among American
children, their adoption and foster care placements are
determined not in accord with their best interests but by
their ethnicity, as a result of a well-intentioned but
profoundly flawed and unconstitutional federal law, the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1901–1963.”408
• “[T]he adoption placement preferences provision of ICWA,
and New Guidelines, all subject Plaintiffs to unequal
treatment under the law based solely on the race of the child
and the adults involved and are therefore unconstitutional
under the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth
Amendment.”409
• “[The State official’s] compliance with and enforcement of
these provisions subjects Plaintiffs to unequal treatment
under color of state and federal law based solely on the race
of the child and the adults involved and therefore deprives
Plaintiffs of equal protection of the law under the Equal

407.
408.
409.

Id. ¶ 1.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 94.
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 42
U.S.C. § 1983.”410
• “The defendants’ implementation of the Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA), codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963,
has given rise to a separate and unequal child custody and
welfare system, a system in which Indian children are
treated as second class citizens. The Constitution does not
tolerate a system that separates children based on race and
subjects them to separate and unequal treatment. ICWA is
such a law.”411
If the Goldwater Institute’s arguments seem confusing or
contradictory, this is because they are. Their theoretical acceptance
requires ignoring the historical foundations and creation of the very
constitutional amendment upon which they rely. For instance, the
Fourteenth Amendment authors made clear that the Amendment in
no way infringed on the federal government’s ability to legislate with
regard to “Indians” because “Indians” refers to citizens of Tribal
Nations, and if the federal government could not legislate with
regard to citizens of Tribal Nations, the government would be
unable to fulfill its treaty obligations to tribal citizens.412
As discussed above, the Fourteenth Amendment did not make
Indians citizens of the United States, and it was not until 1924, when
Congress passed the Indian Citizenship Act,413 that Indians became
United States citizens. Ironically, the Goldwater Institute posits that
tribal citizenship is somehow irrelevant to ICWA’s true application
because “[t]he citizenship that is relevant here is American
citizenship.”414 Under the Institute’s constitutional theory, however,
the 1924 Act that made American Indians “American citizens” would
be unconstitutional, and Indians would have no American
citizenship.415
C.

A.D. v. Washburn—Decision on the Motion to Dismiss

On March 16, 2017, the United States District Court for the
District of Arizona issued its decision on the motions to dismiss filed
410. Id. ¶ 107.
411. Goldwater Class Certification Motion, supra note 401, at 2.
412. See S. REP. NO. 41-268, at 1 (1870).
413. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(b) (2006)).
414. Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 70, at 10.
415. See Elk v. Wilkins 112 U.S. 94, 119–20 (1884).
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by the United States, the State of Arizona, and the two intervenordefendants, the Gila River Community and the Navajo Nation.416
The district court began its analysis by noting that “[i]n this action
the adult Plaintiffs and those who have undertaken to speak for the
child Plaintiffs attempt to challenge parts of the Indian Child
Welfare Act (“ICWA”) as unconstitutional racial discrimination.”417
In its decision, the district court dismissed all of plaintiffs’ claims that
ICWA’s “Indian child” classification constitutes “unconstitutional
racial classification.”418
The district court’s decision, however, was not predicated on
principles related to equal protection or racial discrimination, but
rather, the district court ordered that “all of the pending motions to
dismiss the Amended Complaint will be granted, and the Amended
Complaint will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and lack of
standing.”419 Quoting precedents such as Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
the court dismissed the Goldwater Institute plaintiffs’ claims for
failure to allege an actual injury “fairly traceable” to the application
of ICWA—a deficiency that left the court without jurisdiction under
Article III of the Constitution to hear their claims.420 One by one, the
court addressed each statute and Guidelines section challenged and
noted that Plaintiffs had failed to allege any facts that could
demonstrate that the adoptive placements of the children they
claimed to sue on behalf of had been delayed or in any way
prejudiced by the application of ICWA.421
416. A.D. v. Washburn, No. 15-CV-01259-PHX-NVW, 2017 WL 1019685 (D. Ariz.
Mar. 16, 2017).
417. Id. at 2.
418. Id. at 11–17.
419. Id. at 18.
420. Id. at 8 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)).
421. See id. at 11 (“[T]he Amended Complaint does not allege facts showing that
any of the Plaintiffs suffered a concrete and particularized injury, actual or
imminent, and fairly traceable to § 1911(b).”); id. at 13 (“[T]he Amended
Complaint does not allege facts showing that any of the Plaintiffs suffered a concrete
and particularized injury, actual or imminent, and fairly traceable to § 1912(d).”);
id. at 14 (“[T]he Amended Complaint does not allege facts showing that any of the
Plaintiffs suffered a concrete and particularized injury, actual or imminent, and
fairly traceable to § 1912(e).”); id. at 14 (“[T]he Amended Complaint does not
allege facts showing that any of the Plaintiffs suffered a concrete and particularized
injury, actual or imminent, and fairly traceable to § 1912(f).”); id. at 16 (“[T]he
Amended Complaint does not allege facts showing that any of the Plaintiffs suffered
a concrete and particularized injury, actual or imminent, and fairly traceable to
§ 1915(a).”); id. at 17 (“[T]he Amended Complaint does not allege facts showing
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The court went further, noting that although “Plaintiffs
initiated this action on July 6, 2015, alleging a putative class so
numerous that joinder of all members [was allegedly]
impracticable,” as of March 2017, they had remained unable to
locate or identify a single Indian child who had suffered the harms
they claimed to be caused by ICWA.422 Consequently, after nearly two
years of searching, Plaintiffs remained unable to locate “any
plaintiffs with standing to challenge any provisions of ICWA or the
2015 Guidelines.”423 The court admonished Plaintiffs that “[a]ny
true injury to any child or interested adult can be addressed in the
state court proceeding [where the ICWA proceeding takes place],
based on actual facts before the court, not on [the] hypothetical
concerns” Plaintiffs brought to the federal district court.424
Ultimately, the Goldwater Institute Plaintiffs’ inability to locate
a single Indian child who has suffered the harms that the Goldwater
Institute claims to be caused by ICWA reveals that their lawsuit is not
predicated on any actualized harm. Instead, the Goldwater
Institute’s claims trace their origins to a time in United States history
when the federal government imposed minimum blood quantum
requirements to eliminate the individuals who could be classified as
citizens of Tribal Nations—and thus “Indians” under federal law.
Indeed, the Goldwater Institute Plaintiffs’ suggestion that children
without a certain minimum amount of “Indian” blood should not be
classified as “Indian” under federal law is just as “benevolent” and
“beneficial” to Indians as the Allotment Acts that originated the
blood quantum concept one hundred years before.
VII. CONCLUSION
The recent suggestion by some Supreme Court Justices that a
minimum amount of blood quantum must be required before a
citizen of a Tribal Nation can constitute an “Indian child” under
ICWA is not a new, or even original, concept. Instead, it finds its
origins in a period in American history where the imposition of a
minimum amount of blood quantum was used to attempt to
eradicate Tribal Nations altogether. When analyzed in their proper
that any of the Plaintiffs suffered a concrete and particularized injury, actual or
imminent, and fairly traceable to § 1915(b).”).
422. Id. at 19.
423. Id.
424. Id.

880

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:4

historical context, it is clear that the current constitutional attacks
on ICWA find no support in the actual text or legislative history of
the Fourteenth Amendment itself.
At the turn of the twentieth century, Congress was the branch
of the federal government that attempted to impose minimum blood
quantum requirements to extinguish Tribal Nations and their
citizens. Today, it is the Supreme Court. Congress, of course,
ultimately dismissed the imposition of a federally mandated
minimum blood quantum to define eligibility for tribal citizenship.
One can only hope, therefore, that when ICWA is analyzed in
the full historical and legal context, the Supreme Court will
acknowledge that the constitutional challenges in the National
Council and Goldwater Institute lawsuits have no basis in the United
States Constitution, nor in the historical sovereign-to-sovereign
relations between Indian Nations and the United States. Instead, the
current blood quantum–based challenges to ICWA trace their
origins to an American policy wrongfully designed to eradicate
Tribal Nations and their citizens. National Council and the
Goldwater Institute have returned to the same minimum blood
quantum concept used during the Allotment Acts—the only
distinction being that instead of trying to remove tribal lands from
Tribal Nations, they seek to remove tribal citizens, specifically Indian
children.
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